aiqbench analysis
This research establishes the first PAC learning framework for concurrent stochastic games, offering a rigorous method to compute social-welfare optimal equilibria despite transition uncertainty. By introducing a Nash margin characterization, the algorithm provides verifiable certificates for equilibrium existence or non-existence while maintaining polynomial sample complexity. This theoretical advance is significant for multi-agent systems requiring robust decision-making under model uncertainty.
Robust PAC Learning of Concurrent Stochastic Games
arXiv:2609.04189v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We introduce the first Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning framework for general-sum concurrent stochastic games (CSGs) with transition uncertainty, while addressing the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) existence. Our algorithm maintains data-driven $L^1$ confidence sets over transition kernels and solves a robust CSG to compute a social-welfare optimal $\varepsilon$-NE, using a robust MDP-based exploration mechanism to drive joint state-action coverage. Crucially, we introduce a Nash margin characterisation that enables principled reasoning about equilibrium existence: the framework either returns an $\varepsilon$-approximate NE whose social-welfare value is $\varepsilon$-close to optimal, or provides a sound certificate that no exact NE exists. Under a minimum reachability condition $p_{\mathrm{reach}}>0$ over relevant state-action pairs, the algorithm terminates after a polynomial number of trajectory samples, with sample complexity $\widetilde{O}\left( {R_{\max}^2 H^4 |S|^2 |A| / (p_{\mathrm{reach}} \varepsilon^2)} \right)$. Empirical results on benchmark CSGs demonstrate near-optimal performance, correct handling of equilibrium (non-)existence, and sample complexity consistent with theory.
Abstract:We introduce the first Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning framework for general-sum concurrent stochastic games (CSGs) with transition uncertainty, while addressing the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) existence. Our algorithm maintains data-driven $L^1$ confidence sets over transition kernels and solves a robust CSG to compute a social-welfare optimal $\varepsilon$-NE, using a robust MDP-based exploration mechanism to drive joint state-action coverage. Crucially, we introduce a Nash margin characterisation that enables principled reasoning about equilibrium existence: the framework either returns an $\varepsilon$-approximate NE whose social-welfare value is $\varepsilon$-close to optimal, or provides a sound certificate that no exact NE exists. Under a minimum reachability condition $p_{\mathrm{reach}}>0$ over relevant state-action pairs, the algorithm terminates after a polynomial number of trajectory samples, with sample complexity $\widetilde{O}\left( {R_{\max}^2 H^4 |S|^2 |A| / (p_{\mathrm{reach}} \varepsilon^2)} \right)$. Empirical results on benchmark CSGs demonstrate near-optimal performance, correct handling of equilibrium (non-)existence, and sample complexity consistent with theory.
Machine Learning (cs.LG); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Logic in Computer Science (cs.LO); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA)
arXiv:2609.04189 [cs.LG]
(or arXiv:2609.04189v1 [cs.LG] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.04189 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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