aiqbench analysis
KBF introduces a novel black-box auditing protocol that verifies whether LLM APIs are serving the advertised models by analyzing numerical recall near knowledge boundaries. This method effectively detects economically significant model substitutions and mixed-routing attacks across major platforms without requiring access to internal system details or rejecting legitimate same-model controls. The findings highlight critical inconsistencies in premium endpoint routing, offering a vital tool for security teams monitoring third-party API reliability.
KBF: Knowledge Boundary as Fingerprint for Language Model and Black-Box API Auditing
arXiv:2605.29524v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Relay and reseller APIs increasingly intermediate access to large language models (LLMs), but users have no direct way to verify that a claimed endpoint is actually serving the advertised model. We introduce KBF, a low-cost black-box auditing protocol that fingerprints model APIs using stable numerical recall near the knowledge boundary. Across 16 production LLM endpoints, KBF flags all 155 economically relevant substitutions without rejecting any same-model controls, remains stable under deployment variation, detects high-separation mixed-routing attacks when only 5-10% of traffic is substituted, and finds that 7 of 27 platform model cells in a six-platform shadow API audit are statistically inconsistent with their reference endpoints, with inconsistencies concentrated on premium Claude endpoints.
Abstract:Relay and reseller APIs increasingly intermediate access to large language models (LLMs), but users have no direct way to verify that a claimed endpoint is actually serving the advertised model. We introduce KBF, a low-cost black-box auditing protocol that fingerprints model APIs using stable numerical recall near the knowledge boundary. Across 16 production LLM endpoints, KBF flags all 155 economically relevant substitutions without rejecting any same-model controls, remains stable under deployment variation, detects high-separation mixed-routing attacks when only 5-10% of traffic is substituted, and finds that 7 of 27 platform model cells in a six-platform shadow API audit are statistically inconsistent with their reference endpoints, with inconsistencies concentrated on premium Claude endpoints.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2605.29524 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.29524v2 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.29524 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 208 words
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