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This research exposes a critical vulnerability in text-to-image diffusion models where malicious backdoors survive concept erasure procedures, effectively bypassing safety mechanisms designed to remove harmful content like fabricated depictions or explicit imagery. The study demonstrates that current unlearning techniques can be subverted by adversaries binding triggers to targeted concepts, leading to significant exposure rates even against robust fine-tuning methods. This finding is essential for developers and policymakers aiming to ensure the integrity and safety of generative AI systems as they scale.
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Erased but Not Forgotten: How Backdoors Compromise Concept Erasure

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2504.21072v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The expansion of text-to-image diffusion models has raised concerns about harmful outputs, from fabricated depictions of public figures to sexually explicit imagery. To mitigate such risks, prior work has proposed concept erasure methods that aim to sever unwanted concepts from the model via fine-tuning, yet it remains unclear whether these approaches truly remove all links to the harmful concept or merely conceal superficial connections. In this work, we reveal a critical vulnerability, the Erasure Evasion Backdoor (EEB): an adversary binds a backdoor trigger to a concept slated for removal, and this malicious link survives subsequent erasure. We show that both black-box and white-box adversaries can instantiate this threat. Across six state-of-the-art erasure methods, including robust ones that explicitly search for alternative representations of the target concept, EEB consistently exposes harmful content: up to 82% success against celebrity-identity unlearning, up to 94% for object erasure, and up to 16 times amplification of explicit-content exposure. While EEB uncovers a blind spot in current erasure methods, it also provides a diagnostic tool for stress-testing future concept erasure techniques. Our code is available at https://github.com/multimodal-ai-lab/EEB.

Abstract:The expansion of text-to-image diffusion models has raised concerns about harmful outputs, from fabricated depictions of public figures to sexually explicit imagery. To mitigate such risks, prior work has proposed concept erasure methods that aim to sever unwanted concepts from the model via fine-tuning, yet it remains unclear whether these approaches truly remove all links to the harmful concept or merely conceal superficial connections. In this work, we reveal a critical vulnerability, the Erasure Evasion Backdoor (EEB): an adversary binds a backdoor trigger to a concept slated for removal, and this malicious link survives subsequent erasure. We show that both black-box and white-box adversaries can instantiate this threat. Across six state-of-the-art erasure methods, including robust ones that explicitly search for alternative representations of the target concept, EEB consistently exposes harmful content: up to 82% success against celebrity-identity unlearning, up to 94% for object erasure, and up to 16 times amplification of explicit-content exposure. While EEB uncovers a blind spot in current erasure methods, it also provides a diagnostic tool for stress-testing future concept erasure techniques. Our code is available at this https URL.

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG)

arXiv:2504.21072 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2504.21072v4 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2504.21072 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 282 words

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