Equilibrium Learning in Unbounded Stochastic Games with Gaussian Transitions

Abstract:Learning equilibria from data is difficult when several decision makers interact indefinitely and the system state has no prescribed bounds. We examine discounted general-sum stochastic games with compact action sets and an unknown nonlinear drift observed through Gaussian transition noise. The proposed procedure uses a single uninterrupted trajectory to update Gaussian-process models of the drift and to solve successively refined finite games. We prove a perturbation result showing that stability of equilibrium selection, together with uniform KL accuracy of Gaussian transition models, is sufficient for regional uniform convergence of the induced values and approximate Nash behavior in the original game. The region specifies where the guarantees are evaluated; strategies and dynamics continue to act on the entire Euclidean state space. For GP estimators, simultaneous confidence bounds yield a rate controlled by posterior uncertainty, kernel information gain, and joint-state dimension. Numerical studies illustrate how kernel choice and dimension appear in the predicted convergence behavior.

Machine Learning (stat.ML); Machine Learning (cs.LG)

arXiv:2610.16149 [stat.ML]

(or arXiv:2610.16149v1 [stat.ML] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.16149 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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