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This research resolves a longstanding open question by proving that quantum blind-unforgeability is strictly stronger than plus-one unforgeability, establishing a definitive hierarchy in quantum signature security. The authors introduce a novel "smoothing" technique that coherently rescales query histories to transform attackers with minimal loss, marking a conceptual shift from previous extraction-based approaches that fail in general cases. This advancement refines the theoretical foundations of post-quantum cryptography and offers new tools for analyzing black-box quantum-query algorithms.
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What this isA model's reading of the article and related coverage, written for aiqbench. Not the publisher's words.

Blind Unforgeability implies Plus-One Unforgeability

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2610.00517v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We prove that quantum blind-unforgeability implies quantum plus-one unforgeability, settling an open question in the literature. Since plus-one unforgeability is known not to imply blind-unforgeability, our result establishes that blind-unforgeability is \emph{strictly stronger} than plus-one unforgeability in the quantum setting. The implication is proven using a new \emph{smoothing} technique that coherently rescales the query histories of a quantum-query algorithm in a black-box manner. This enables us to transform any successful plus-one attacker into a blind-unforgeability attacker with only inverse-polynomial loss. Our proof represents a conceptual shift from merely extracting a useful query history as in earlier attempts, which we show inevitably fails in general, to first coherently reshaping how query histories interfere.

Abstract:We prove that quantum blind-unforgeability implies quantum plus-one unforgeability, settling an open question in the literature. Since plus-one unforgeability is known not to imply blind-unforgeability, our result establishes that blind-unforgeability is \emph{strictly stronger} than plus-one unforgeability in the quantum setting. The implication is proven using a new \emph{smoothing} technique that coherently rescales the query histories of a quantum-query algorithm in a black-box manner. This enables us to transform any successful plus-one attacker into a blind-unforgeability attacker with only inverse-polynomial loss. Our proof represents a conceptual shift from merely extracting a useful query history as in earlier attempts, which we show inevitably fails in general, to first coherently reshaping how query histories interfere.

Quantum Physics (quant-ph); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)

arXiv:2610.00517 [quant-ph]

(or arXiv:2610.00517v1 [quant-ph] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.00517 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 210 words

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