AutoDojo: A Generative Benchmark for Evaluating Prompt Injection Defenses in LLM Agents

arXiv:2606.15057v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents. Thus, a growing body of work has proposed a variety of defensive approaches against IPI which can be grouped into three broad categories: prompt-level, filter-based, and system-level designs. However, commonly used benchmarks for evaluating defense, such as AgentDojo, are \emph{inherently static}, generating a fixed distribution of IPI attacks. Consequently, a defense can score well on them without being robust to adaptive threats. We introduce \textbf{AutoDojo}, a generative benchmark built on AgentDojo and AgentDyn that generates IPI \emph{adaptively} for a given agent and defense. It supports six task suites across the two benchmarks, covering banking, communication, travel, shopping, coding, and everyday-assistant domains. AutoDojo optimizes injections under a strict black-box setting, observing only whether a candidate injection succeeds, and can readily integrate, and often improve on, any existing black-box attack. Across ten defenses and five target models, AutoDojo demonstrates that standard static benchmarks often significantly overestimate defense efficacy. Moreover, we show that most existing defenses either sacrifice considerable utility or are insecure. Finally, we demonstrate that attack success interacts with task specification, with under-specified tasks particularly vulnerable. AutoDojo is available at https://github.com/xhOwenMa/AutoDojo

Abstract:Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents. Thus, a growing body of work has proposed a variety of defensive approaches against IPI which can be grouped into three broad categories: prompt-level, filter-based, and system-level designs. However, commonly used benchmarks for evaluating defense, such as AgentDojo, are \emph{inherently static}, generating a fixed distribution of IPI attacks. Consequently, a defense can score well on them without being robust to adaptive threats. We introduce \textbf{AutoDojo}, a generative benchmark built on AgentDojo and AgentDyn that generates IPI \emph{adaptively} for a given agent and defense. It supports six task suites across the two benchmarks, covering banking, communication, travel, shopping, coding, and everyday-assistant domains. AutoDojo optimizes injections under a strict black-box setting, observing only whether a candidate injection succeeds, and can readily integrate, and often improve on, any existing black-box attack. Across ten defenses and five target models, AutoDojo demonstrates that standard static benchmarks often significantly overestimate defense efficacy. Moreover, we show that most existing defenses either sacrifice considerable utility or are insecure. Finally, we demonstrate that attack success interacts with task specification, with under-specified tasks particularly vulnerable. AutoDojo is available at this https URL

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2606.15057 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2606.15057v3 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.15057 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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AutoDojo: A Generative Benchmark for Evaluating Prompt Injection Defenses in LLM Agents

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