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This research introduces TACIT, a lightweight linear probe that reads safety signals directly from an LLM's frozen internal states without decoding tokens or retraining the backbone. By distinguishing between harmful content and unsafe tool use through orthogonal internal directions, the method achieves superior detection accuracy while requiring significantly fewer parameters and less time than full fine-tuning. This approach offers a scalable solution for mitigating agentic risks in complex multi-step workflows where traditional guard models fail.
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Agent Safety From Within: Detecting Harmful Trajectories from LLM Internal States

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2609.33039v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Language model agents can now perform sophisticated sequences of actions via tools and harnesses, which has increased the scope of the damage they can cause. Guard models, however, are mainly built for content moderation and thus are not well-suited to detecting this agentic risk. To address this, we proceed by first conducting a representational analysis, then use the resulting insights to build a solution. In our analysis, we focus on two types of trajectory-level agentic harms: harmful content, which is expressed directly, and unsafe tool use, which depends on whether an action is consistent with the interaction that produced it. We investigate how open-source guard models represent these two types of harm and find that they are linearly readable inside the model, even though guard models predict no better than chance on pairs that differ only in the called tool's schema. The two harm types also follow nearly orthogonal internal directions, and neither reliably serves as a proxy for the other. These results motivate reading trajectory safety directly from internal states. We introduce TACIT, a readout of a frozen backbone's internal states that decodes no tokens. Trained on six trajectory-safety benchmarks, a linear probe raises mean macro-F1 from 62.3 for the strongest open guard to 80.7, and refined readouts reach 86.2. With each benchmark held out of training entirely, the refined readouts still lead the strongest guard (65.7 vs. 61.1). With the same backbone, training data and test split, the frozen readout is on par with full safety fine-tuning, and it improves the fine-tuned model further when applied on top. The probe trains about one millionth as many parameters as full fine-tuning in about a sixth of the time, and TACIT has the lowest latency of the guards we evaluate.

Abstract:Language model agents can now perform sophisticated sequences of actions via tools and harnesses, which has increased the scope of the damage they can cause. Guard models, however, are mainly built for content moderation and thus are not well-suited to detecting this agentic risk. To address this, we proceed by first conducting a representational analysis, then use the resulting insights to build a solution. In our analysis, we focus on two types of trajectory-level agentic harms: harmful content, which is expressed directly, and unsafe tool use, which depends on whether an action is consistent with the interaction that produced it. We investigate how open-source guard models represent these two types of harm and find that they are linearly readable inside the model, even though guard models predict no better than chance on pairs that differ only in the called tool's schema. The two harm types also follow nearly orthogonal internal directions, and neither reliably serves as a proxy for the other. These results motivate reading trajectory safety directly from internal states. We introduce TACIT, a readout of a frozen backbone's internal states that decodes no tokens. Trained on six trajectory-safety benchmarks, a linear probe raises mean macro-F1 from 62.3 for the strongest open guard to 80.7, and refined readouts reach 86.2. With each benchmark held out of training entirely, the refined readouts still lead the strongest guard (65.7 vs. 61.1). With the same backbone, training data and test split, the frozen readout is on par with full safety fine-tuning, and it improves the fine-tuned model further when applied on top. The probe trains about one millionth as many parameters as full fine-tuning in about a sixth of the time, and TACIT has the lowest latency of the guards we evaluate.

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2609.33039 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2609.33039v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.33039 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 384 words

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