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This research introduces Agent MechSuits, a novel white-box defense framework that leverages mechanistic interpretability to detect and mitigate safety risks in multi-turn CLI agents by intervening directly within model hidden representations. By moving beyond external guardrails, the study establishes a new benchmark for understanding evolving risk dynamics during autonomous agent execution, offering a more granular approach to securing LLM-based systems.
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Agent MechSuits: Mechanistic Subspace Safety Steering for Multi-Turn CLI Agents

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2606.22673v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Command-Line Interface (CLI) agents based on large language models (LLMs) demonstrate remarkable autonomous capabilities, but they also introduce significant safety and misuse risks during multi-turn interactions with external environments. Existing safety mechanisms mainly rely on external guardrails, which have a limited ability to perform fine-grained behavioral control during execution. Meanwhile, recent mechanistic interpretability methods for LLM safety are mostly confined to single-turn or jailbreak-style QA settings, limiting their ability to capture the evolving risk dynamics of multi-turn agent execution. In this paper, we investigate the safety of multi-turn CLI agents from an internal perspective. We propose Agent MechSuits (Mechanistic Subspace Intervention and Steering), a white-box defense framework that performs runtime safety detection and representation-level mitigation for CLI agents. Unlike conventional agent guardrails, Agent MechSuits detects harmful execution states from step-level hidden representations and mitigates unsafe behavior by intervening in a 10-dimensional subspace within a single layer. To support this research, we introduce the Mechanistic Agent Safety (MAS) benchmark, comprising comprehensively annotated multi-turn execution trajectories across 194 tasks using LLaMA-3.1-8B, Qwen-2.5-7B, and Gemma-2-9B. Extensive experiments show that Agent MechSuits achieves strong safety detection performance, provides preliminary evidence for lookahead risk anticipation, and substantially reduces harmful actions of the CLI agent, establishing a foundation for applying mechanistic interpretability to dynamic LLM agent safety.

Abstract:Command-Line Interface (CLI) agents based on large language models (LLMs) demonstrate remarkable autonomous capabilities, but they also introduce significant safety and misuse risks during multi-turn interactions with external environments. Existing safety mechanisms mainly rely on external guardrails, which have a limited ability to perform fine-grained behavioral control during execution. Meanwhile, recent mechanistic interpretability methods for LLM safety are mostly confined to single-turn or jailbreak-style QA settings, limiting their ability to capture the evolving risk dynamics of multi-turn agent execution. In this paper, we investigate the safety of multi-turn CLI agents from an internal perspective. We propose Agent MechSuits (Mechanistic Subspace Intervention and Steering), a white-box defense framework that performs runtime safety detection and representation-level mitigation for CLI agents. Unlike conventional agent guardrails, Agent MechSuits detects harmful execution states from step-level hidden representations and mitigates unsafe behavior by intervening in a 10-dimensional subspace within a single layer. To support this research, we introduce the Mechanistic Agent Safety (MAS) benchmark, comprising comprehensively annotated multi-turn execution trajectories across 194 tasks using LLaMA-3.1-8B, Qwen-2.5-7B, and Gemma-2-9B. Extensive experiments show that Agent MechSuits achieves strong safety detection performance, provides preliminary evidence for lookahead risk anticipation, and substantially reduces harmful actions of the CLI agent, establishing a foundation for applying mechanistic interpretability to dynamic LLM agent safety.

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Software Engineering (cs.SE)

arXiv:2606.22673 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2606.22673v2 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.22673 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 306 words

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