hunt-cicd
From the author
Hunt CI/CD pipeline vulnerabilities — GitHub Actions workflow injection (pull_request_target Pwnrequest + ${{ }}-into-shell), self-hosted runner poisoning, OIDC trust-policy abuse, Jenkins script-console RCE and CVE-2024-23897 file read, GitLab CI runner-token registration, Terraform state file leakage, artifact/log secret leakage, pipeline env-var disclosure. Use when target has a public GitHub/GitLab org, exposed CI dashboards (Jenkins/TeamCity/Drone/Argo), or build artifacts/images are reachable.
Install
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-cicd -a claude-code
Installs to .claude/skills/hunt-cicd/ · Each command fetches the skill straight from GitHub with the open skills CLI.
No download: this skill’s licence (MIT) does not let us redistribute its files. The install commands fetch them from GitHub instead.
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