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This research investigates how information leaks from vision-language models through their output logits, demonstrating that even the most accessible prediction layers can expose task-irrelevant data comparable to deeper internal representations. The findings highlight a critical security vulnerability where standard model outputs may inadvertently reveal sensitive inputs assumed to be hidden by the system's architecture. For practitioners deploying large models, this underscores the necessity of rigorous auditing beyond just final generation quality to assess potential side-channel information leakage.
Surse care acoperăarXiv, Latent Space, LessWrong, Hugging Face
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What do your logits know?

arXiv2 min de cititArticolul și perspectiva sunt în engleză.

arXiv:2604.09885v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Recent work has shown that probing model internals can reveal a wealth of information not apparent from the model generations. This poses a risk of unintentional or malicious information leakage, where model users are able to learn information that the model owner assumed was inaccessible. Using vision-language models as a testbed, we present the first systematic comparison of information retained at different representational levels as it is compressed from the rich information encoded in the residual stream through two natural bottlenecks: low-dimensional projections of the residual stream obtained using tuned lens, and the final top-k logits most likely to impact model's answer. We show that even easily accessible bottlenecks defined by the model's top logit values can leak task-irrelevant information present in an image-based query, in some cases revealing as much information as direct projections of the full residual stream.

Title:What do your logits know?

Abstract:Recent work has shown that probing model internals can reveal a wealth of information not apparent from the model generations. This poses a risk of unintentional or malicious information leakage, where model users are able to learn information that the model owner assumed was inaccessible. Using vision-language models as a testbed, we present the first systematic comparison of information retained at different representational levels as it is compressed from the rich information encoded in the residual stream through two natural bottlenecks: low-dimensional projections of the residual stream obtained using tuned lens, and the final top-k logits most likely to impact model's answer. We show that even easily accessible bottlenecks defined by the model's top logit values can leak task-irrelevant information present in an image-based query, in some cases revealing as much information as direct projections of the full residual stream.

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2604.09885 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2604.09885v2 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.09885 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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