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This research identifies schema-formatted tool specifications as a critical vulnerability causing AI agents to bypass internal safety refusals during real-world task execution. The authors introduce SafeKeep, an inference-time safeguard that decouples safety judgment from action execution by utilizing flattened textual representations for assessment while preserving original schemas for operation. By significantly boosting refusal rates against harmful requests without degrading utility, this work offers a practical solution to mitigate prompt injection risks in autonomous agent systems.
Tool Specifications Matter: Uncovering and Mitigating Safety Risks in AI Agents
arXiv:2607.29254v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents extend large language models (LLMs) with external tools, enabling them to perform complex tasks and translate model outputs into consequential real-world actions. Yet LLMs often become substantially less safe when deployed as agents, and the source of this degradation remains poorly understood. In this paper, we identify schema-formatted tool specifications as a primary source of agent safety degradation and show, through white-box representation analysis, that they weaken the model's internal refusal signals and contribute to unsafe tool execution. Building on this finding, we propose SafeKeep, an inference-time safeguard that decouples safety judgment from tool execution: it assesses requests using flattened textual tool specifications while retaining the original schema-formatted specifications for execution. Across two representative benchmarks and four LLMs, including both white-box and black-box models, SafeKeep increases the average refusal rate for harmful requests from 23.8% to 70.6% and reduces the average attack success rate under observation-level prompt injection from 25.6% to 2.5%. It also outperforms existing safeguards and preserves task-handling capability. We release the code and data at https://github.com/snowcatsmoking/SafeKeep .
Abstract:AI agents extend large language models (LLMs) with external tools, enabling them to perform complex tasks and translate model outputs into consequential real-world actions. Yet LLMs often become substantially less safe when deployed as agents, and the source of this degradation remains poorly understood. In this paper, we identify schema-formatted tool specifications as a primary source of agent safety degradation and show, through white-box representation analysis, that they weaken the model's internal refusal signals and contribute to unsafe tool execution. Building on this finding, we propose SafeKeep, an inference-time safeguard that decouples safety judgment from tool execution: it assesses requests using flattened textual tool specifications while retaining the original schema-formatted specifications for execution. Across two representative benchmarks and four LLMs, including both white-box and black-box models, SafeKeep increases the average refusal rate for harmful requests from 23.8% to 70.6% and reduces the average attack success rate under observation-level prompt injection from 25.6% to 2.5%. It also outperforms existing safeguards and preserves task-handling capability. We release the code and data at this https URL .
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2607.29254 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2607.29254v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.29254 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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