Max Planck Institute Develops Tools to Detect Chip Tampering

© Judith Büthe for MPG · mpg.de Sixty-four metal pins extend from a chip barely larger than a fingernail, a stark reminder of the physical complexity, and potential attack surface, hidden within modern electronics. Researchers at the Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy are developing methods to detect hardware tampering and build chips resistant to both physical manipulation and future quantum attacks. The team uses open-source software, HAL, to analyze chip schematics and is proactively enhancing open-source chips with quantum-secure circuits. “Manipulation deep within a chip would be almost impossible to detect – and could threaten entire infrastructures.” This capability is particularly vital in detecting hardware Trojans, circuits intentionally embedded to create security vulnerabilities and compromise data integrity, a standard scenario in related research. While HAL does not function as a fully automated vulnerability scanner due to the sheer variety of potential Trojan designs, it effectively narrows the search for analysts, highlighting areas of interest within a complex chip layout. The software’s utility extends beyond academic research, attracting interest from government research laboratories and agencies, as well as companies focused on security-critical applications. “Most HAL users are companies working in security-related fields,” explains Julian Speith, a postdoctoral researcher involved…