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This research introduces T-MAP, a trajectory-aware evolutionary search method designed specifically to red-team autonomous LLM agents within multi-step tool execution environments like the Model Context Protocol. By leveraging actual execution paths rather than just text outputs, the technique successfully bypasses safety guardrails and realizes harmful objectives against frontier models, exposing critical vulnerabilities in current agent architectures.
T-MAP: Red-Teaming LLM Agents with Trajectory-aware Evolutionary Search
arXiv:2603.22341v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: While prior red-teaming efforts have focused on eliciting harmful text outputs from large language models (LLMs), such approaches fail to capture agent-specific vulnerabilities that emerge through multi-step tool execution, particularly in rapidly growing ecosystems such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP). To address this gap, we propose a trajectory-aware evolutionary search method, T-MAP, which leverages execution trajectories to guide the discovery of adversarial prompts. Our approach enables the automatic generation of attacks that not only bypass safety guardrails but also reliably realize harmful objectives through actual tool interactions. Empirical evaluations across diverse MCP environments demonstrate that T-MAP substantially outperforms baselines in attack realization rate (ARR) and remains effective against frontier models, including GPT-5.2, Gemini-3-Pro, Qwen3.5, and GLM-5, thereby revealing previously underexplored vulnerabilities in autonomous LLM agents. Code is available at https://github.com/pwnhyo/T-MAP.
Abstract:While prior red-teaming efforts have focused on eliciting harmful text outputs from large language models (LLMs), such approaches fail to capture agent-specific vulnerabilities that emerge through multi-step tool execution, particularly in rapidly growing ecosystems such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP). To address this gap, we propose a trajectory-aware evolutionary search method, T-MAP, which leverages execution trajectories to guide the discovery of adversarial prompts. Our approach enables the automatic generation of attacks that not only bypass safety guardrails but also reliably realize harmful objectives through actual tool interactions. Empirical evaluations across diverse MCP environments demonstrate that T-MAP substantially outperforms baselines in attack realization rate (ARR) and remains effective against frontier models, including GPT-5.2, Gemini-3-Pro, Qwen3.5, and GLM-5, thereby revealing previously underexplored vulnerabilities in autonomous LLM agents. Code is available at this https URL.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL)
arXiv:2603.22341 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.22341v2 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.22341 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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