Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Quantumness

Abstract:With the rapid development of quantum computers, proofs of quantumness have recently become an interesting research direction. However, in current schemes for proofs of quantumness, quantum provers face the risk of being maliciously exploited by classical verifiers. Through malicious strategies in interaction with quantum provers, classical verifiers could solve some instances of hard problems that arise from the specific scheme in use. This is due to the lack of formalization that prevents malicious verifiers from extracting useful information in proofs of quantumness. To address this issue, we formalize zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness. Intuitively, the zero-knowledge property necessitates that the information gained by the classical verifier from interactions with the quantum prover should not surpass what can be simulated using a simulated classical prover interacting with the same verifier. As a result, the new zero-knowledge notion can prevent a malicious verifier from exploiting quantum advantage. We find that the classical zero-knowledge proof is sufficient to compile some existing proofs of quantumness schemes into zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness schemes. It appears to be more general to require zero-knowledge proof on the verifier side instead of the prover side. This helps to regulate the verifier's behavior from malicious to be honest-but-curious. As a result, both parties will play not only one role in the proofs of quantumness but also the dual role in the classical zero-knowledge proof. Specifically, Shor's factoring-based scheme and the learning with errors-based scheme in [Brakerski et al., FOCS, 2018] can be transformed into zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness by requiring an extractable non-interactive zero-knowledge argument on the verifier side. Zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness can thus be viewed as an enhanced security notion for proofs of quantumness.

19 pages, 8 figures. Published in IACR Communications in Cryptology

arXiv:2609.23455 [quant-ph]

(or arXiv:2609.23455v1 [quant-ph] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.23455 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

IACR Communications in Cryptology, vol. 1, no. 4, 2025

https://doi.org/10.62056/ayiv4fe-3 Focus to learn more DOI(s) linking to related resources

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