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This research introduces XPhysICS, a method for cross-domain threat transfer in industrial control systems that rigorously validates whether cyber-physical effects from one plant can structurally apply to another. By separating source abstraction from deterministic target grounding using specific eligibility criteria, the study addresses critical gaps in assessing ICS security across different infrastructure types like water treatment and chemical processes. The work advances AI safety and system reliability by providing a framework to evaluate threat reuse without relying solely on semantic similarity.
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XPhysICS: Cross-Physical-Domain Threat Grounding for Industrial Control Systems Security

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2609.30805v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Industrial control system (ICS) threats documented for one plant can express cyber-physical effects relevant to another, but semantic similarity alone does not establish whether those effects are structurally admissible or evaluable on a target. We present XPhysICS, a provenance-aware, target-conditioned method that separates analyst-guided source abstraction from deterministic grounding into target-specific validation slices. Given a fixed source abstraction, vocabulary and schema, and machine-validated target contract, XPhysICS evaluates candidate mappings using five eligibility criteria: role compatibility, implemented type compatibility, stage coherence, slice viability, and rule-surface applicability. Grounding acceptance, slice adequacy, dynamic realizability, consumer applicability, and consumer outcome remain distinct evidence layers. We evaluate 83 structured source-threat abstractions across water treatment, water distribution, hydro/water-energy, and chemical-process targets. Controlled target-side studies of SWaT-to-water-treatment and WADI-to-water-distribution groundings produce clean, nominal-confounded, and near-threshold consumer outcomes; nine Hydro/GRFICS cases extend bounded validation-slice execution. We also evaluate bounded predictive, state-aware, and phase-aware consumer lanes, the unmodified upstream GeCo implementation, and a paper-derived reproduction of a physics-guided search method over three frozen groundings. Results show that cross-domain ICS threat reuse requires traceable source semantics, explicit target-conditioned grounding criteria, and careful separation of subsequent target-side evidence.

Abstract:Industrial control system (ICS) threats documented for one plant can express cyber-physical effects relevant to another, but semantic similarity alone does not establish whether those effects are structurally admissible or evaluable on a target. We present XPhysICS, a provenance-aware, target-conditioned method that separates analyst-guided source abstraction from deterministic grounding into target-specific validation slices. Given a fixed source abstraction, vocabulary and schema, and machine-validated target contract, XPhysICS evaluates candidate mappings using five eligibility criteria: role compatibility, implemented type compatibility, stage coherence, slice viability, and rule-surface applicability. Grounding acceptance, slice adequacy, dynamic realizability, consumer applicability, and consumer outcome remain distinct evidence layers. We evaluate 83 structured source-threat abstractions across water treatment, water distribution, hydro/water-energy, and chemical-process targets. Controlled target-side studies of SWaT-to-water-treatment and WADI-to-water-distribution groundings produce clean, nominal-confounded, and near-threshold consumer outcomes; nine Hydro/GRFICS cases extend bounded validation-slice execution. We also evaluate bounded predictive, state-aware, and phase-aware consumer lanes, the unmodified upstream GeCo implementation, and a paper-derived reproduction of a physics-guided search method over three frozen groundings. Results show that cross-domain ICS threat reuse requires traceable source semantics, explicit target-conditioned grounding criteria, and careful separation of subsequent target-side evidence.

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2609.30805 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2609.30805v1 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.30805 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 285 words

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