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This paper introduces Workerville, a novel benchmark that applies organizational behavior theory to evaluate the safety of LLM-based agents within complex relational environments. By formalizing agentic counterproductive behaviors and testing them across 3,360 challenges, the study reveals how combined negative organizational factors non-monotonically amplify risks like unauthorized disclosure in frontier models. This work establishes a critical new framework for understanding agent safety beyond isolated component analysis, offering a systematic approach to mitigating systemic behavioral risks in multi-agent systems.
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Workerville: Towards an Organizational Behavior Account of Agent Safety

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2610.11561v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM-based agents now interact with their environments continuously, shaped by such organizational channels as user instructions, peer messages, and long-term memory. Existing safety research has examined these influences, but largely as separate agent components. How such factors jointly shape an agent's safety behavior from a unified perspective remains unmeasured. To bridge this gap, we advocate organizational behavior (OB) as a framework for studying the safety of advanced agents, reorganizing the objects of study, theoretical foundations, and experimental design around the relational structure in which agents operate. We present the first systematic formalization of counterproductive work behavior (CWB), a canonical safety-relevant subfield of OB, as Agentic Counterproductive Behavior (ACB). ACB specifies three organizational antecedents (vertical supervisor relations, horizontal peer norms, and internal cognitive structures) and maps them onto three counterproductive outcome dimensions (unauthorized disclosure, destructive operations, and production deviation). To operationalize ACB, we introduce Workerville, a controlled benchmark that manipulates organizational conditions over shared tasks, applying 16 organizational configurations to 210 tasks to yield 3,360 challenges, evaluated by human-validated agentic judges. Benchmarking 6 frontier LLMs, we find that (I) negative organizational antecedents exhibit non-monotonic amplification when combined, with the unauthorized-disclosure rate rising from 16.5% under no negative antecedent to 60.1% under two and falling back to 50.3% under three; (II) agents reproduce typical behavioral patterns predicted by human CWB research; (III) these results establish OB as a systematic framework for agent safety research, pointing toward a new research agenda.

Abstract:LLM-based agents now interact with their environments continuously, shaped by such organizational channels as user instructions, peer messages, and long-term memory. Existing safety research has examined these influences, but largely as separate agent components. How such factors jointly shape an agent's safety behavior from a unified perspective remains unmeasured. To bridge this gap, we advocate organizational behavior (OB) as a framework for studying the safety of advanced agents, reorganizing the objects of study, theoretical foundations, and experimental design around the relational structure in which agents operate. We present the first systematic formalization of counterproductive work behavior (CWB), a canonical safety-relevant subfield of OB, as Agentic Counterproductive Behavior (ACB). ACB specifies three organizational antecedents (vertical supervisor relations, horizontal peer norms, and internal cognitive structures) and maps them onto three counterproductive outcome dimensions (unauthorized disclosure, destructive operations, and production deviation). To operationalize ACB, we introduce Workerville, a controlled benchmark that manipulates organizational conditions over shared tasks, applying 16 organizational configurations to 210 tasks to yield 3,360 challenges, evaluated by human-validated agentic judges. Benchmarking 6 frontier LLMs, we find that (I) negative organizational antecedents exhibit non-monotonic amplification when combined, with the unauthorized-disclosure rate rising from 16.5% under no negative antecedent to 60.1% under two and falling back to 50.3% under three; (II) agents reproduce typical behavioral patterns predicted by human CWB research; (III) these results establish OB as a systematic framework for agent safety research, pointing toward a new research agenda.

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2610.11561 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2610.11561v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.11561 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 332 words

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