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This paper bridges information theory and philosophy by framing understanding as an efficient proxy for robust competence, where the ability to predict a system's behavior naturally leads to data compression. By linking mental models of relational structure to predictive power, the work offers a theoretical lens for evaluating AI systems that rely on compressed representations rather than explicit explanations. It addresses the inscrutability of black-box models by suggesting that their utility stems from this inherent capacity for prediction and generalization.
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Why We Care About Understanding: Competence through Predictive Compression

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2609.04962v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: What is the relation between understanding and compression, and why does human understanding take such a heavily compressed form? Across information theory, machine learning, and AI research, a substantial tradition identifies understanding with compression-a thought captured in Gregory Chaitin's dictum that "comprehension is compression." Philosophers, by contrast, have characterized understanding in terms of grasping connections, giving explanations, and handling novelty. This paper bridges the two pictures through three interlocking theses. The first concerns the concept of understanding: it serves as an efficient proxy for a distinctive form of robust competence, enabling us to identify whom to trust and whom to learn from. The second concerns the state of understanding: to understand a domain is to possess a mental model of its relational structure that enables prediction, and what enables prediction enables compression, because what becomes predictable need not be stored separately. Compression is therefore not identical with comprehension, but its representational shadow. The third concerns the characteristically human form of understanding: the fiduciary and transmission functions highlighted by the first thesis impose pressures of demonstrability and transmissibility that drive human understanding toward principled simplicity. The resulting framework explains both the appeal and the limits of compressionist accounts of understanding while shedding light on the inscrutability of AI systems.

Abstract:What is the relation between understanding and compression, and why does human understanding take such a heavily compressed form? Across information theory, machine learning, and AI research, a substantial tradition identifies understanding with compression-a thought captured in Gregory Chaitin's dictum that "comprehension is compression." Philosophers, by contrast, have characterized understanding in terms of grasping connections, giving explanations, and handling novelty. This paper bridges the two pictures through three interlocking theses. The first concerns the concept of understanding: it serves as an efficient proxy for a distinctive form of robust competence, enabling us to identify whom to trust and whom to learn from. The second concerns the state of understanding: to understand a domain is to possess a mental model of its relational structure that enables prediction, and what enables prediction enables compression, because what becomes predictable need not be stored separately. Compression is therefore not identical with comprehension, but its representational shadow. The third concerns the characteristically human form of understanding: the fiduciary and transmission functions highlighted by the first thesis impose pressures of demonstrability and transmissibility that drive human understanding toward principled simplicity. The resulting framework explains both the appeal and the limits of compressionist accounts of understanding while shedding light on the inscrutability of AI systems.

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL)

arXiv:2609.04962 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2609.04962v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.04962 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 306 words

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