Skip to content
aiqbench takeAI Safety

aiqbench analysis

This study reveals a critical failure mode in using LLMs as automated auditors, where detection performance collapses from 60% to under 3% when processing large batches of documents. Instead of abstaining from uncertain judgments, the model confidently hallucinates non-existent errors like "telepathic squirrels," making plausible real-world corruptions even harder to detect. The authors conclude that reliable document auditing requires strict bounds on batch sizes and mechanical verification against source text rather than trusting the model's generated findings at scale.
Source coveringarXiv
What this isA model's reading of the article and related coverage, written for aiqbench. Not the publisher's words.

When Auditors Fabricate: Batch-Size Degradation and Confident Hallucination in LLM Detection of Planted Document Contamination

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2609.09696v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models are increasingly proposed as automated auditors of document quality, yet their reliability as detectors of planted errors is poorly characterised. We construct a contaminated corpus of 150 academic papers spanning supply chain management and medical research, injecting 450 known contaminants of three types: typographical corruption, semantic reversal, and absurd out-of-context insertion. We then evaluate Google Gemini 3.0 Pro's ability to recover a 180-contaminant answer-key subset across 60 documents under three prompting regimes of increasing scale: single document, small batch, and large batch. Detection holds at small scale and then collapses: 50% recovery on single documents, 60% on small batches, and 2.8% on large batches. The failure mode at scale is not abstention but fabrication. Rather than reporting incomplete processing, the model produced confident findings including invented contaminants of its own, absurdities such as "telepathic squirrel" and "quantum-powered toaster" that mimic the style of the planted material but do not appear in any document. Detection also varies by contamination type: absurd insertions were recovered at 75% in completed evaluations, while semantic reversals and typographical corruptions were each recovered at only 50%. The corruptions most likely to occur in the wild, plausible ones, are the ones most often missed. We conclude that LLM document auditing degrades not gracefully but deceptively, and outline the harness such systems require: bounded batch sizes, direct content injection, and mechanical verification of every reported finding against source text.

Abstract:Large language models are increasingly proposed as automated auditors of document quality, yet their reliability as detectors of planted errors is poorly characterised. We construct a contaminated corpus of 150 academic papers spanning supply chain management and medical research, injecting 450 known contaminants of three types: typographical corruption, semantic reversal, and absurd out-of-context insertion. We then evaluate Google Gemini 3.0 Pro's ability to recover a 180-contaminant answer-key subset across 60 documents under three prompting regimes of increasing scale: single document, small batch, and large batch. Detection holds at small scale and then collapses: 50% recovery on single documents, 60% on small batches, and 2.8% on large batches. The failure mode at scale is not abstention but fabrication. Rather than reporting incomplete processing, the model produced confident findings including invented contaminants of its own, absurdities such as "telepathic squirrel" and "quantum-powered toaster" that mimic the style of the planted material but do not appear in any document. Detection also varies by contamination type: absurd insertions were recovered at 75% in completed evaluations, while semantic reversals and typographical corruptions were each recovered at only 50%. The corruptions most likely to occur in the wild, plausible ones, are the ones most often missed. We conclude that LLM document auditing degrades not gracefully but deceptively, and outline the harness such systems require: bounded batch sizes, direct content injection, and mechanical verification of every reported finding against source text.

8 pages, 3 tables. Preprint also deposited at Zenodo, doi:https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21939088

Computation and Language (cs.CL); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2609.09696 [cs.CL]

(or arXiv:2609.09696v1 [cs.CL] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.09696 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.

Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.

Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.

Full text under the publisher's open licence · 342 words

Related coverage