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When appearance and motion disagree: evaluating class--motion consistency against disguised uncrewed surface vessels
arXiv:2611.00367v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Defense systems for maritime assets must distinguish approaching benign craft from uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) with sufficient warning to act. Shore cameras using computer vision can separate hostile vessels from benign traffic, but these systems may be attacked using an adversarial hull patch or physical disguise. We evaluate adversarial hull patches and find they suppress detection in up to 29% of attempts but never cause misclassification as benign. Physical disguise, however, can bypass both a camera check and a radar presence check. To evaluate defenses, we develop a hybrid replay protocol from automatic identification system (AIS) tracks that combines recorded benign motion with direct or off-axis attack run-ins. We find that for recreational-labeled vessels attacking via direct run-in within 4 nautical miles, an asset-relative closing-rate check flags 94-95% at 15-20 knots, compared with 12% for a track-only speed check. The checks are complementary on off-axis approaches, constraining the attacker to remain below both thresholds and extending the time required to reach the asset. Flagging on either check has a 4.9% held-out false-alarm rate overall and 12.3% on recreational traffic. The replay-based evaluation protocol supports comparative test and evaluation of defense methods.
Abstract:Defense systems for maritime assets must distinguish approaching benign craft from uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) with sufficient warning to act. Shore cameras using computer vision can separate hostile vessels from benign traffic, but these systems may be attacked using an adversarial hull patch or physical disguise. We evaluate adversarial hull patches and find they suppress detection in up to 29% of attempts but never cause misclassification as benign. Physical disguise, however, can bypass both a camera check and a radar presence check. To evaluate defenses, we develop a hybrid replay protocol from automatic identification system (AIS) tracks that combines recorded benign motion with direct or off-axis attack run-ins. We find that for recreational-labeled vessels attacking via direct run-in within 4 nautical miles, an asset-relative closing-rate check flags 94-95% at 15-20 knots, compared with 12% for a track-only speed check. The checks are complementary on off-axis approaches, constraining the attacker to remain below both thresholds and extending the time required to reach the asset. Flagging on either check has a 4.9% held-out false-alarm rate overall and 12.3% on recreational traffic. The replay-based evaluation protocol supports comparative test and evaluation of defense methods.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV); Robotics (cs.RO)
arXiv:2611.00367 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2611.00367v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2611.00367 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 294 words