aiqbench analysis
WAInjectBench addresses a critical gap in AI security by providing the first systematic evaluation of prompt injection defenses specifically tailored for web agents, rather than general LLMs. The study reveals that current detectors struggle significantly against attacks using imperceptible perturbations or implicit instructions, highlighting urgent vulnerabilities in autonomous web browsing systems. This benchmark offers essential datasets and code to improve the robustness of next-generation AI agents against sophisticated adversarial inputs.
WAInjectBench: Benchmarking Prompt Injection Detections for Web Agents
arXiv:2510.01354v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Multiple prompt injection attacks have been proposed against web agents. At the same time, various methods have been developed to detect general prompt injection attacks, but none have been systematically evaluated for web agents. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting the first comprehensive benchmark study on detecting prompt injection attacks targeting web agents. We begin by introducing a fine-grained categorization of such attacks based on the threat model. We then construct datasets containing both malicious and benign samples: malicious text segments generated by different attacks, benign text segments from four categories, malicious images produced by attacks, and benign images from two categories. Next, we systematize both text-based and image-based detection methods. Finally, we evaluate their performance across multiple scenarios. Our key findings show that while some detectors can identify attacks that rely on explicit textual instructions or visible image perturbations with moderate to high accuracy, they largely fail against attacks that omit explicit instructions or employ imperceptible perturbations. Our datasets and code are released at: https://github.com/Norrrrrrr-lyn/WAInjectBench.
Abstract:Multiple prompt injection attacks have been proposed against web agents. At the same time, various methods have been developed to detect general prompt injection attacks, but none have been systematically evaluated for web agents. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting the first comprehensive benchmark study on detecting prompt injection attacks targeting web agents. We begin by introducing a fine-grained categorization of such attacks based on the threat model. We then construct datasets containing both malicious and benign samples: malicious text segments generated by different attacks, benign text segments from four categories, malicious images produced by attacks, and benign images from two categories. Next, we systematize both text-based and image-based detection methods. Finally, we evaluate their performance across multiple scenarios. Our key findings show that while some detectors can identify attacks that rely on explicit textual instructions or visible image perturbations with moderate to high accuracy, they largely fail against attacks that omit explicit instructions or employ imperceptible perturbations. Our datasets and code are released at: this https URL.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL)
arXiv:2510.01354 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2510.01354v2 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2510.01354 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 271 words
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