aiqbench analysis
This research systematically evaluates how Large Language Models succumb to persuasion, revealing that verbalized confidence prompting can paradoxically accelerate belief erosion rather than strengthening robustness. The study highlights significant model-dependent vulnerabilities, where smaller architectures like Llama 3.2-3B exhibit extreme compliance while specific fine-tuning strategies yield mixed results across different model families. These findings are critical for developers aiming to build trustworthy AI systems that maintain factual integrity under adversarial conversational pressures.
Vulnerability of LLMs' Stated Beliefs? LLMs Belief Resistance Check Through Strategic Persuasive Conversation Interventions
arXiv:2601.13590v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly employed in various question-answering tasks. However, recent studies showcase that LLMs are susceptible to persuasion and could adopt counterfactual beliefs. We present a systematic evaluation of LLM susceptibility to persuasion under the \emph{Source--Message--Channel--Receiver} (SMCR) communication framework. Across six mainstream Large Language Models (LLMs) and three domains (factual knowledge, medical QA, and social bias), we analyze how different persuasive strategies influence stated belief stability over multiple interaction turns. We further examine whether verbalized confidence prompting (i.e., eliciting self-reported confidence scores) affects resistance to persuasion. Results show that the smallest model (Llama 3.2-3B) exhibits extreme compliance, with 82.5\% of belief changes occurring at the first persuasive turn (average end turn of 1.1--1.4). Contrary to expectations, verbalized confidence prompting \emph{increases} vulnerability by accelerating belief erosion rather than enhancing robustness. Finally, an exploratory study of adversarial fine-tuning reveals highly model-dependent effectiveness: GPT-4o-mini achieves near-complete robustness (98.6\%), and Mistral~7B improves substantially (35.7\% $\rightarrow$ 79.3\%), but Llama models remain highly susceptible ($<$14\% RQ1) even when fine-tuned on their own failure cases. Together, these findings highlight substantial model-dependent limits of current robustness interventions and offer guidance for developing more trustworthy LLMs.
Title:Vulnerability of LLMs' Stated Beliefs? LLMs Belief Resistance Check Through Strategic Persuasive Conversation Interventions
Abstract:Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly employed in various question-answering tasks. However, recent studies showcase that LLMs are susceptible to persuasion and could adopt counterfactual beliefs. We present a systematic evaluation of LLM susceptibility to persuasion under the \emph{Source--Message--Channel--Receiver} (SMCR) communication framework. Across six mainstream Large Language Models (LLMs) and three domains (factual knowledge, medical QA, and social bias), we analyze how different persuasive strategies influence stated belief stability over multiple interaction turns. We further examine whether verbalized confidence prompting (i.e., eliciting self-reported confidence scores) affects resistance to persuasion. Results show that the smallest model (Llama 3.2-3B) exhibits extreme compliance, with 82.5\% of belief changes occurring at the first persuasive turn (average end turn of 1.1--1.4). Contrary to expectations, verbalized confidence prompting \emph{increases} vulnerability by accelerating belief erosion rather than enhancing robustness. Finally, an exploratory study of adversarial fine-tuning reveals highly model-dependent effectiveness: GPT-4o-mini achieves near-complete robustness (98.6\%), and Mistral~7B improves substantially (35.7\% $\rightarrow$ 79.3\%), but Llama models remain highly susceptible ($<$14\% RQ1) even when fine-tuned on their own failure cases. Together, these findings highlight substantial model-dependent limits of current robustness interventions and offer guidance for developing more trustworthy LLMs.
Computation and Language (cs.CL); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2601.13590 [cs.CL]
(or arXiv:2601.13590v4 [cs.CL] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2601.13590 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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