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This research exposes a critical gap in Out-of-Distribution (OOD) detection for language models, demonstrating that features distinguishing input groups do not necessarily produce reliable anomaly rankings. The study reveals that performance metrics like AUROC can drastically degrade when text length is controlled or when feature-space interventions equalize group spread, challenging current evaluation practices. Consequently, developers must verify the actual ranking utility of their OOD scores rather than relying solely on feature discriminability.
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Useful Features, Backward Scores: OOD in Language-Model Trajectories

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2605.00269v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Out-of-distribution (OOD) detectors prioritize inputs for closer inspection. Yet features that distinguish input groups need not yield a useful anomaly ranking. We analyze this gap in language-model trajectories under text-length control and fixed score directions. On Spam development data, an input adaptation of D^2HScore falls from raw AUROC 0.919 to 0.530 after length matching. On length-matched, held-out HateSpeech inputs, the same features yield AUROC 0.644 for a labeled linear classifier but 0.444 for an ID-fitted distance score. ToxicChat shows the same contrast. Feature-selection and backbone controls retain the main reversal pattern. Frozen Civil Comments and TweetEval irony tests also reverse (0.467 and 0.435), extending the finding beyond toxicity. In these contrasts, anomalous groups have farther centers but tighter spread. A labeled, fixed-center feature-space intervention changes rankings: equalizing spread helps some tasks and harms others. OOD evaluation must check the chosen score's ranking even when its features distinguish the classes.

Abstract:Out-of-distribution (OOD) detectors prioritize inputs for closer inspection. Yet features that distinguish input groups need not yield a useful anomaly ranking. We analyze this gap in language-model trajectories under text-length control and fixed score directions. On Spam development data, an input adaptation of D^2HScore falls from raw AUROC 0.919 to 0.530 after length matching. On length-matched, held-out HateSpeech inputs, the same features yield AUROC 0.644 for a labeled linear classifier but 0.444 for an ID-fitted distance score. ToxicChat shows the same contrast. Feature-selection and backbone controls retain the main reversal pattern. Frozen Civil Comments and TweetEval irony tests also reverse (0.467 and 0.435), extending the finding beyond toxicity. In these contrasts, anomalous groups have farther centers but tighter spread. A labeled, fixed-center feature-space intervention changes rankings: equalizing spread helps some tasks and harms others. OOD evaluation must check the chosen score's ranking even when its features distinguish the classes.

Computation and Language (cs.CL); Machine Learning (cs.LG)

arXiv:2605.00269 [cs.CL]

(or arXiv:2605.00269v2 [cs.CL] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.00269 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

code_supplement/README.md

code_supplement/manifest.json

code_supplement/numeric/CivilTest.npy

code_supplement/numeric/CivilTest_labels.npy

code_supplement/numeric/CivilTest_lengths.npy

code_supplement/numeric/CivilTest_scores.npy

code_supplement/numeric/CivilValidation.npy

code_supplement/numeric/HateSpeech.npy

code_supplement/numeric/HateSpeech_bootstrap_aurocs.npy

code_supplement/numeric/HateSpeech_distances.npy

code_supplement/numeric/HateSpeech_labels.npy

code_supplement/numeric/HateSpeech_lengths.npy

code_supplement/numeric/HateSpeech_scores.npy

code_supplement/numeric/Jailbreak.npy

code_supplement/numeric/Jailbreak_bootstrap_aurocs.npy

code_supplement/numeric/Jailbreak_distances.npy

code_supplement/numeric/Jailbreak_labels.npy

code_supplement/numeric/Jailbreak_lengths.npy

code_supplement/numeric/Jailbreak_scores.npy

code_supplement/numeric/Spam.npy

code_supplement/numeric/Spam_bootstrap_aurocs.npy

code_supplement/numeric/Spam_distances.npy

code_supplement/numeric/Spam_labels.npy

code_supplement/numeric/Spam_lengths.npy

code_supplement/numeric/Spam_scores.npy

code_supplement/numeric/ToxicChat.npy

code_supplement/numeric/ToxicChat_bootstrap_aurocs.npy

code_supplement/numeric/ToxicChat_distances.npy

code_supplement/numeric/ToxicChat_labels.npy

code_supplement/numeric/ToxicChat_lengths.npy

code_supplement/numeric/ToxicChat_scores.npy

code_supplement/numeric/civil_bootstrap_estimates.npy

code_supplement/numeric/features.npy

code_supplement/numeric/id.npy

code_supplement/numeric/labels.npy

code_supplement/numeric/lengths.npy

code_supplement/numeric/ood.npy

code_supplement/numeric/reference.npy

code_supplement/numeric/roles.npy

code_supplement/numeric/values.npy

code_supplement/paper/verify_code_supplement.py

code_supplement/src/utils/radial_analysis.py

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