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This research addresses a critical reliability gap in deployed deepfake speech detectors by introducing an unsupervised drift monitor that operates on internal embeddings without requiring new labels. By defining trusted, ambiguous, and novel regions in the embedding space, the method effectively detects dataset mismatches and prevents the acceptance of spoofed audio while managing false positives caused by environmental shifts. The study reframes deployed voice authentication systems as reliability problems rather than simple binary classifiers, offering a practical solution for maintaining security against evolving attack vectors.
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Unsupervised Data Drift Monitoring for Deployed Deepfake Speech Detectors

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2610.16826v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Deepfake speech detectors are typically evaluated as binary classifiers on fixed benchmarks, but deployed systems face evolving attacks, codecs, speakers, and recording conditions, with labels unavailable during operation. This makes it difficult to know when a detector operates in familiar conditions and can be relied on. We propose an unsupervised drift monitor that operates on the internal embeddings of a deployed detector. The monitor compares each input against bona fide and spoof references using regularized Mahalanobis distances. These distances define trusted, ambiguous, and novel regions of the detector embedding space, allowing unfamiliar inputs to be routed for review. We evaluate the monitor on four modern detectors on three datasets. The monitor raises alerts for dataset mismatches and substantially reduces the security-critical case of accepting deepfakes at the cost of reduced automatic coverage. The results also show that drift affects both classes: bona fide recordings can move away from the training reference, increasing alert rates even in in-domain settings. Our findings suggest that deployed deepfake speech detectors should be treated not only as a binary classification, but also as a reliability problem.

Abstract:Deepfake speech detectors are typically evaluated as binary classifiers on fixed benchmarks, but deployed systems face evolving attacks, codecs, speakers, and recording conditions, with labels unavailable during operation. This makes it difficult to know when a detector operates in familiar conditions and can be relied on. We propose an unsupervised drift monitor that operates on the internal embeddings of a deployed detector. The monitor compares each input against bona fide and spoof references using regularized Mahalanobis distances. These distances define trusted, ambiguous, and novel regions of the detector embedding space, allowing unfamiliar inputs to be routed for review. We evaluate the monitor on four modern detectors on three datasets. The monitor raises alerts for dataset mismatches and substantially reduces the security-critical case of accepting deepfakes at the cost of reduced automatic coverage. The results also show that drift affects both classes: bona fide recordings can move away from the training reference, increasing alert rates even in in-domain settings. Our findings suggest that deployed deepfake speech detectors should be treated not only as a binary classification, but also as a reliability problem.

Sound (cs.SD); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV); Machine Learning (cs.LG)

arXiv:2610.16826 [cs.SD]

(or arXiv:2610.16826v1 [cs.SD] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.16826 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Full text under the publisher's open licence · 214 words

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