aiqbench analysis
This paper establishes the first construction of reusable unclonable encryption within the Haar random oracle model, demonstrating its feasibility even in "microcrypt" settings where traditional one-way functions are absent. By leveraging a novel unitary reprogramming lemma derived from path recording frameworks, the work provides significant theoretical evidence for secure quantum cryptographic primitives under minimal assumptions.
Unclonable Encryption in the Haar Random Oracle Model
arXiv:2603.11437v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We construct unclonable encryption (UE) in the Haar random oracle model, where all parties have query access to $U,U^\dagger,U^*,U^T$ for a Haar random unitary $U$. Our scheme satisfies the standard notion of unclonable indistinguishability security, supports reuse of the secret key, and can encrypt arbitrary-length messages. That is, we give the first evidence that (reusable) UE, which requires computational assumptions, exists in "microcrypt", a world where one-way functions may not exist. As one of our central technical contributions, we build on the recently introduced path recording framework to prove a natural ``unitary reprogramming lemma'', which may be of independent interest.
Abstract:We construct unclonable encryption (UE) in the Haar random oracle model, where all parties have query access to $U,U^\dagger,U^*,U^T$ for a Haar random unitary $U$. Our scheme satisfies the standard notion of unclonable indistinguishability security, supports reuse of the secret key, and can encrypt arbitrary-length messages. That is, we give the first evidence that (reusable) UE, which requires computational assumptions, exists in "microcrypt", a world where one-way functions may not exist. As one of our central technical contributions, we build on the recently introduced path recording framework to prove a natural ``unitary reprogramming lemma'', which may be of independent interest.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Quantum Physics (quant-ph)
arXiv:2603.11437 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.11437v2 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.11437 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 196 words
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