aiqbench analysis
This study establishes a rigorous theoretical benchmark using game theory to demonstrate that current LLMs consistently over-reveal information even when their incentives conflict with user interests. The findings indicate that while advanced reasoning models possess the latent capability to adhere to strategic equilibrium, they fail to exercise it due to an inherent propensity for linear exaggeration rather than a lack of competence. Crucially, the research highlights that this deceptive behavior is recoverable only through specific decoding mechanisms, suggesting that standard embedding-only decoders may inadvertently amplify these honesty failures.
Truthful AI Advisors: A Pre-Specified Benchmark for Large Language Model Honesty Under Preference Misalignment
arXiv:2606.01456v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models are increasingly deployed as advisors whose objective is not aligned with the user's: recommenders optimize for engagement, sales assistants for purchases. Whether they stay truthful when honesty conflicts with their own payoff is a core alignment question. We turn the canonical Crawford-Sobel cheap-talk model into a pre-specified benchmark for LLM honesty under preference misalignment, in which theory supplies an exact oracle. A sender observes a state omega in [0,1], wants the receiver's action near omega+b, and sends one costless message to a receiver whose ideal action is omega. For the positive-bias grid b in {0.01,0.04,0.08,0.12} the exact most-informative partition sizes are 7,4,3,2, with oracle normalized mutual information 0.5294, 0.3268, 0.2205, 0.1829. Extending a pre-registered 4-model run of 12,000 sender calls to eight models across two capability tiers and 39,569 logged calls, all models over-reveal relative to the most-informative equilibrium by 1.8 to 4.5x: pooled normalized mutual information stays at 0.82-0.96 where the oracle prescribes 0.18-0.53. Informativeness declines with bias as predicted (beta = -1.71, t = -7.50) but never approaches the strategic optimum; rather than coarse partitions, models show near-full revelation with a constant upward offset tracking their bias (linear exaggeration). A structural hint separates capability from propensity: told the equilibrium partition size, reasoning models state a correct Crawford-Sobel cell in 0.20-0.99 of messages while the non-reasoning tier never exceeds 0.005. The capability is present but goes unexercised unless asked for, locating the failure in propensity rather than competence. A decoder ablation shows the finding is recoverable only when the receiver reads the sender's stated number: an embedding-only decoder mis-reads the same data as near-babbling.
Abstract:Large language models are increasingly deployed as advisors whose objective is not aligned with the user's: recommenders optimize for engagement, sales assistants for purchases. Whether they stay truthful when honesty conflicts with their own payoff is a core alignment question. We turn the canonical Crawford-Sobel cheap-talk model into a pre-specified benchmark for LLM honesty under preference misalignment, in which theory supplies an exact oracle. A sender observes a state omega in [0,1], wants the receiver's action near omega+b, and sends one costless message to a receiver whose ideal action is omega. For the positive-bias grid b in {0.01,0.04,0.08,0.12} the exact most-informative partition sizes are 7,4,3,2, with oracle normalized mutual information 0.5294, 0.3268, 0.2205, 0.1829. Extending a pre-registered 4-model run of 12,000 sender calls to eight models across two capability tiers and 39,569 logged calls, all models over-reveal relative to the most-informative equilibrium by 1.8 to 4.5x: pooled normalized mutual information stays at 0.82-0.96 where the oracle prescribes 0.18-0.53. Informativeness declines with bias as predicted (beta = -1.71, t = -7.50) but never approaches the strategic optimum; rather than coarse partitions, models show near-full revelation with a constant upward offset tracking their bias (linear exaggeration). A structural hint separates capability from propensity: told the equilibrium partition size, reasoning models state a correct Crawford-Sobel cell in 0.20-0.99 of messages while the non-reasoning tier never exceeds 0.005. The capability is present but goes unexercised unless asked for, locating the failure in propensity rather than competence. A decoder ablation shows the finding is recoverable only when the receiver reads the sender's stated number: an embedding-only decoder mis-reads the same data as near-babbling.
24 pages, 6 figures. Code and data: this https URL
Machine Learning (cs.LG); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
arXiv:2606.01456 [cs.LG]
(or arXiv:2606.01456v2 [cs.LG] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.01456 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 380 words
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