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This study applies evolutionary game theory to model user trust in AI not as a static decision but as a dynamic process co-evolving with developer compliance strategies. The analysis identifies conditions under which safe systems become widely adopted, specifically when regulatory penalties outweigh safety costs and monitoring remains feasible for users. These findings offer concrete theoretical support for governance frameworks emphasizing transparency and low-cost oversight mechanisms to prevent the proliferation of unsafe AI models.
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Trust or Check? Understanding the (Evolutionary) Dynamics of User Trust in AI Systems

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2603.24742v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As the capabilities and adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems grow, trust in these AI systems is an increasingly urgent concern. Much research has focused on models of AI governance and has primarily examined incentives for safe development and effective regulation. Hence they typically represented users trust as a one-shot adoption choice rather than as a dynamic, evolving process shaped by repeated interactions. We instead model trust as the dynamic choice of reduced monitoring in a repeated, asymmetric interaction between users and AI developers, where checking developers' behaviour is costly. Using evolutionary game theory, we study how users' strategies of trust and developers' strategies of providing safe (compliant) or unsafe (non-compliant) AI co-evolve under different levels of monitoring cost and institutional regimes. We conduct the analysis on both imitation-based and learning-based perspectives, with the stochastic finite-population dynamics, the infinite-population replicator analysis and the reinforcement learning analysis. We find three robust long-run regimes: no adoption by users while developers provide unsafe AI, unsafe but widely adopted systems, and safe systems that are widely adopted. Only the last is desirable, and it arises when penalties for unsafe behaviour exceed the extra cost of safety and users can still afford to monitor at least occasionally. Our results formally support governance proposals that emphasise transparency, low-cost monitoring, and meaningful sanctions, and they show that neither regulation alone nor blind user trust is sufficient to prevent the drift towards unsafe or low-adoption outcomes.

Authors:Adeela Bashir, Zhao Song, Ndidi Bianca Ogbo, Nataliya Balabanova, Martin Smit, Chin-wing Leung, Paolo Bova, Manuel Chica Serrano, Dhanushka Dissanayake, Manh Hong Duong, Elias Fernandez Domingos, Nikita Huber-Kralj, Marcus Krellner, Andrew Powell, Stefan Sarkadi, Fernando P. Santos, Zia Ush Shamszaman, Chaimaa Tarzi, Paolo Turrini, Grace Ibukunoluwa Ufeoshi, Victor A. Vargas-Perez, Alessandro Di Stefano, Simon T. Powers, The Anh Han

Abstract:As the capabilities and adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems grow, trust in these AI systems is an increasingly urgent concern. Much research has focused on models of AI governance and has primarily examined incentives for safe development and effective regulation. Hence they typically represented users trust as a one-shot adoption choice rather than as a dynamic, evolving process shaped by repeated interactions. We instead model trust as the dynamic choice of reduced monitoring in a repeated, asymmetric interaction between users and AI developers, where checking developers' behaviour is costly. Using evolutionary game theory, we study how users' strategies of trust and developers' strategies of providing safe (compliant) or unsafe (non-compliant) AI co-evolve under different levels of monitoring cost and institutional regimes. We conduct the analysis on both imitation-based and learning-based perspectives, with the stochastic finite-population dynamics, the infinite-population replicator analysis and the reinforcement learning analysis. We find three robust long-run regimes: no adoption by users while developers provide unsafe AI, unsafe but widely adopted systems, and safe systems that are widely adopted. Only the last is desirable, and it arises when penalties for unsafe behaviour exceed the extra cost of safety and users can still afford to monitor at least occasionally. Our results formally support governance proposals that emphasise transparency, low-cost monitoring, and meaningful sanctions, and they show that neither regulation alone nor blind user trust is sufficient to prevent the drift towards unsafe or low-adoption outcomes.

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA); Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems (nlin.AO)

arXiv:2603.24742 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2603.24742v2 [cs.AI] for this version)

Full text under the publisher's open licence · 319 words

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