aiqbench analysis
TraceGuard introduces an adaptive filtering method that leverages cross-feature rank agreement to detect and remove stealthy data poisoning attacks in multimodal training datasets. By analyzing corpus-level features without requiring victim model training, the system effectively neutralizes threats across various image-text learning configurations while minimizing false positives on clean data. This research directly addresses critical vulnerabilities in the integrity of foundational models derived from external sources.
TraceGuard: Adaptive Multimodal Poison Filtering through Cross-Feature Rank Agreement
arXiv:2609.29099v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multimodal training relies on image-text corpora collected from external sources, creating opportunities for attackers to poison the data. Stealthy attacks can preserve plausible image-text pairs while concealing the differences used by detectors, so apparently clean data can still redirect the trained model. We therefore ask which properties a poison set must preserve for the attack to remain effective. A small poison set must still exert enough collective influence during training to induce the attacker's target behavior. We analyze this influence in terms of how often an attack pattern occurs and how strongly the examples carrying it jointly affect the model. This analysis motivates six corpus-level features that examine cross-modal neighborhoods, recurring text, and changes after text-span erasure without training the victim model. We introduce TraceGuard, an adaptive rank-based filtering method that uses agreement among complementary feature rankings to identify suspicious examples. It refines the selected set through shared patterns and adapts the removal threshold to each corpus without knowing the attack or poison rate. Across 19 attack configurations spanning image-text learning, generative vision-language model fine-tuning, and encoder-transfer tests, TraceGuard removes an average of 98.4% of poisoned examples and 5.4% of clean examples. After training on the filtered corpora, the residual attack metric is at most 1% in 13 configurations. Matched-removal controls and ablations support the contributions of sample selection and adaptive removal. Stress tests also identify detection failures under adaptive attacks and unnecessary removal on poison-free corpora.
Abstract:Multimodal training relies on image-text corpora collected from external sources, creating opportunities for attackers to poison the data. Stealthy attacks can preserve plausible image-text pairs while concealing the differences used by detectors, so apparently clean data can still redirect the trained model. We therefore ask which properties a poison set must preserve for the attack to remain effective. A small poison set must still exert enough collective influence during training to induce the attacker's target behavior. We analyze this influence in terms of how often an attack pattern occurs and how strongly the examples carrying it jointly affect the model. This analysis motivates six corpus-level features that examine cross-modal neighborhoods, recurring text, and changes after text-span erasure without training the victim model. We introduce TraceGuard, an adaptive rank-based filtering method that uses agreement among complementary feature rankings to identify suspicious examples. It refines the selected set through shared patterns and adapts the removal threshold to each corpus without knowing the attack or poison rate. Across 19 attack configurations spanning image-text learning, generative vision-language model fine-tuning, and encoder-transfer tests, TraceGuard removes an average of 98.4% of poisoned examples and 5.4% of clean examples. After training on the filtered corpora, the residual attack metric is at most 1% in 13 configurations. Matched-removal controls and ablations support the contributions of sample selection and adaptive removal. Stress tests also identify detection failures under adaptive attacks and unnecessary removal on poison-free corpora.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2609.29099 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2609.29099v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.29099 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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