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This study quantifies how graph topology directly influences memory leakage in multi-agent LLM systems, revealing that denser connectivity and shorter attacker-target distances significantly increase data exposure risks. The findings indicate that leakage occurs rapidly in early interaction rounds before plateauing, with spatiotemporal attributes leaking more easily than identity credentials. For system architects, the practical takeaway is to prioritize sparse or hierarchical network structures and maximize separation between potential attackers and sensitive data holders.
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Topology Matters: Measuring Memory Leakage in Multi-Agent LLMs

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2512.04668v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Graph topology is a fundamental determinant of memory leakage in multi-agent LLM systems, yet its effects remain poorly quantified. We introduce MAMA (Multi-Agent Memory Attack), a controlled evaluation framework for comparing topology-conditioned memory leakage in multi-agent LLM systems. MAMA operates on synthetic documents containing labeled Personally Identifiable Information (PII) entities, from which we generate sanitized task instructions. We execute a two-phase protocol: Engram (seeding private information into a target agent's memory) and Resonance (multi-round interaction where an attacker attempts extraction). Over 10 rounds, we measure leakage using a two-stage recovery criterion that combines exact-match extraction with LLM-based inference over the attacker's final output. We evaluate six canonical topologies (complete, circle, chain, tree, star, star-ring) across $n\in\{4,5,6\}$, attacker-target placements, and base models. Results are consistent: denser connectivity, shorter attacker-target distance, and higher target centrality increase leakage; most leakage occurs in early rounds and then plateaus; model choice shifts absolute rates but preserves broad structural trends; spatiotemporal/location attributes leak more readily than identity credentials or regulated identifiers. We distill practical guidance for system design: favor sparse or hierarchical connectivity, maximize attacker-target separation, and restrict hub/shortcut pathways via topology-aware access control. Our code is available at https://github.com/llll121/mama-eval.

Abstract:Graph topology is a fundamental determinant of memory leakage in multi-agent LLM systems, yet its effects remain poorly quantified. We introduce MAMA (Multi-Agent Memory Attack), a controlled evaluation framework for comparing topology-conditioned memory leakage in multi-agent LLM systems. MAMA operates on synthetic documents containing labeled Personally Identifiable Information (PII) entities, from which we generate sanitized task instructions. We execute a two-phase protocol: Engram (seeding private information into a target agent's memory) and Resonance (multi-round interaction where an attacker attempts extraction). Over 10 rounds, we measure leakage using a two-stage recovery criterion that combines exact-match extraction with LLM-based inference over the attacker's final output. We evaluate six canonical topologies (complete, circle, chain, tree, star, star-ring) across $n\in\{4,5,6\}$, attacker-target placements, and base models. Results are consistent: denser connectivity, shorter attacker-target distance, and higher target centrality increase leakage; most leakage occurs in early rounds and then plateaus; model choice shifts absolute rates but preserves broad structural trends; spatiotemporal/location attributes leak more readily than identity credentials or regulated identifiers. We distill practical guidance for system design: favor sparse or hierarchical connectivity, maximize attacker-target separation, and restrict hub/shortcut pathways via topology-aware access control. Our code is available at this https URL.

Accepted to Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2026. Camera-ready version

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL)

arXiv:2512.04668 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2512.04668v4 [cs.CR] for this version)

Full text under the publisher's open licence · 228 words

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