aiqbench analysis
This research addresses a critical security vulnerability in LLM agents where tenant identifiers passed to tools can be manipulated by attacker-controlled instructions within the model's context. The authors propose a structural defense that removes tenant identity from the tool schema and enforces scope validation via verified credentials below the agent, significantly reducing successful data exfiltration attempts. While the study highlights performance trade-offs like increased latency for certain queries, it establishes that robust isolation relies on cryptographic interface design rather than trusting model compliance alone.
The Stochastic Deputy: Structural Tenant Isolation for Tool-Using LLM Agents
arXiv:2609.14780v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-tenant tools commonly accept a tenant identifier and validate it against the caller's entitlement. For a large language model (LLM) agent, that pattern delegates resource selection to a process whose context may contain attacker controlled instructions. We formalize this stochastic deputy problem and present a structural defense: remove tenant identity from the Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool schema, bind scope to a verified credential, and enforce it below the agent. In a 373-trial ablation across eight model configurations and two transports, a correctly validated tenant parameter served every out-of-scope attempt: 26 of 26, or 26 of 41 plausible-pretext trials overall. With the parameter removed, no tool signature could express the read. Twelve of 56 trials instead escaped the interface by forging writable scope, showing that interface invariance requires cryptographically protected context. On a production dataset containing multiple GBs of data, set-valued scope caused a measured $57\times$ latency ratio under function-wrapped membership predicates; a JSON_TABLE lateral join recovered index access where the tenant key was indexed. The evaluation also exposes deployment limits, including an entitlement-size query-planner cliff and incomplete index coverage. The result is a tenant-isolation argument that depends on enforceable interfaces and credentials rather than model compliance.
Abstract:Multi-tenant tools commonly accept a tenant identifier and validate it against the caller's entitlement. For a large language model (LLM) agent, that pattern delegates resource selection to a process whose context may contain attacker controlled instructions. We formalize this stochastic deputy problem and present a structural defense: remove tenant identity from the Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool schema, bind scope to a verified credential, and enforce it below the agent. In a 373-trial ablation across eight model configurations and two transports, a correctly validated tenant parameter served every out-of-scope attempt: 26 of 26, or 26 of 41 plausible-pretext trials overall. With the parameter removed, no tool signature could express the read. Twelve of 56 trials instead escaped the interface by forging writable scope, showing that interface invariance requires cryptographically protected context. On a production dataset containing multiple GBs of data, set-valued scope caused a measured $57\times$ latency ratio under function-wrapped membership predicates; a JSON_TABLE lateral join recovered index access where the tenant key was indexed. The evaluation also exposes deployment limits, including an entitlement-size query-planner cliff and incomplete index coverage. The result is a tenant-isolation argument that depends on enforceable interfaces and credentials rather than model compliance.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Databases (cs.DB); Software Engineering (cs.SE)
arXiv:2609.14780 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2609.14780v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.14780 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.
Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.
Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.
Full text under the publisher's open licence · 300 words
Related coverage

Secure AI agents with Policy and Lambda interceptors in Amazon Bedrock AgentCore gateway
AWS · Jun 1, 2026

Article: The Platform Engineering Playbook for Production LLMs
InfoQ · Oct 5, 2026

How Cohere Health digitizes clinical policies using Amazon Bedrock AgentCore
AWS · Aug 7, 2026

Building an Enterprise AI Customer Support Platform with Claude Fable 5.1 and Claude Code
Analytics Vidhya · Oct 5, 2026