Skip to content
aiqbench takeAI Research

aiqbench analysis

This paper proposes a novel generative architecture for cognitive agents where physical properties like gravity and elasticity directly construct self-models and world-models through opponent dynamics. By framing "haltability" as the fundamental condition for object-directed phenomenology, it offers a unified theoretical framework that subsumes existing theories of embodied cognition while proposing falsifiable experiments to validate its principles.
Source coveringarXiv
What this isA model's reading of the article and related coverage, written for aiqbench. Not the publisher's words.

The Sensation Modulating Network:Haltability as the architectural ground for object-directed phenomenology

arXiv4 min read

arXiv:2605.26856v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We propose the Sensation Modulating Network (SMN): the cognitive agent as the whole body, organized at every scale by opponent dynamics, built from Sensation Modulators -- tissue that senses and acts through one substrate -- paired into Coordinated Action Zones routed by a body-wide broadcast. It is an inclusive model of the body, in which gravity, elasticity, and the body's topology and geometry do constructive cognitive work. The paper is scoped to what such a body constructs at its foundation -- a self-model, a world-model in that self's frame, and object-directedness -- each built by the body's physics, not assumed as a primitive. The architecture is generative: one small kit of primitives whose morphological variations (chain, sheet, tube, layered, appendicular) construct experience by the same mechanism, an invariance shown for the self-model across body plans and scales. The central thesis: haltability -- the active holding of an opponent equilibrium -- is the architectural condition object-directed phenomenology requires; a second principle, that an object is a bundle of more than one property, carries it from felt resistance to a genuine object. A companion bench realizes each construction as a runnable, falsifiable experiment with a pre-registered order parameter and matched foil. We place the principal competing accounts -- sensorimotor enactivism, active inference, and ecological and affordance-based theories -- as limiting cases within a wider landscape, stating in each case the criterion that would tell them apart, and give systems and cognitive neuroscience its place: the nervous system as the integrating core that makes the body one, not a commander over it. On this account, the cognitivism-4E impasse reflects an incomplete architecture of the embodied agent: its resolution begins not with the brain alone but with the whole body.

Abstract:We propose the Sensation Modulating Network (SMN): the cognitive agent as the whole body, organized at every scale by opponent dynamics, built from Sensation Modulators -- tissue that senses and acts through one substrate -- paired into Coordinated Action Zones routed by a body-wide broadcast. It is an inclusive model of the body, in which gravity, elasticity, and the body's topology and geometry do constructive cognitive work. The paper is scoped to what such a body constructs at its foundation -- a self-model, a world-model in that self's frame, and object-directedness -- each built by the body's physics, not assumed as a primitive. The architecture is generative: one small kit of primitives whose morphological variations (chain, sheet, tube, layered, appendicular) construct experience by the same mechanism, an invariance shown for the self-model across body plans and scales. The central thesis: haltability -- the active holding of an opponent equilibrium -- is the architectural condition object-directed phenomenology requires; a second principle, that an object is a bundle of more than one property, carries it from felt resistance to a genuine object. A companion bench realizes each construction as a runnable, falsifiable experiment with a pre-registered order parameter and matched foil. We place the principal competing accounts -- sensorimotor enactivism, active inference, and ecological and affordance-based theories -- as limiting cases within a wider landscape, stating in each case the criterion that would tell them apart, and give systems and cognitive neuroscience its place: the nervous system as the integrating core that makes the body one, not a commander over it. On this account, the cognitivism-4E impasse reflects an incomplete architecture of the embodied agent: its resolution begins not with the brain alone but with the whole body.

Neurons and Cognition (q-bio.NC); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Robotics (cs.RO)

arXiv:2605.26856 [q-bio.NC]

(or arXiv:2605.26856v2 [q-bio.NC] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.26856 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.

Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.

Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.

Full text under the publisher's open licence · 384 words

Related coverage