aiqbench analysis
This study isolates category-specific harm signals in large language models to determine their distinct role beyond general harmfulness representations. The findings reveal that while the encoding of specific risks varies across categories, these fine-grained residuals consistently amplify downstream alignment with shared general harm concepts. Consequently, effective LLM safety strategies must account for these nuanced internal components rather than relying solely on broad harm filters.
The Role of Fine-grained Harm Signals in LLM Safety
arXiv:2609.19366v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Prior work has shown that internal harmfulness representations in large language models vary across risk categories, while sharing a common general harm representation component. This raises a question about the role of the category-specific component beyond general harm representation in LLM safety. To answer this question, we isolate the category-specific component by removing shared general harmfulness representation from each categorical harmfulness representation, yielding a category residual that is orthogonal to general harmfulness at every layer. Using activation steering with category residuals across 11 risk categories in 3 instruction-tuned LLMs, we find that whether category residuals encode harmfulness varies across categories, and that this category-wise pattern is similar across models. Whether category residuals induce refusal also varies across categories, but this category-wise pattern is more model-dependent. We also find that category residuals increase LLMs' downstream internal alignment with shared general harmfulness representation. Together, these findings demonstrate that more fine-grained category residuals should also be considered beyond shared general harmfulness representation to fully understand LLM safety. More broadly, our findings show that even a direction orthogonal to a concept at one layer can contribute to the concept's downstream amplification.
Abstract:Prior work has shown that internal harmfulness representations in large language models vary across risk categories, while sharing a common general harm representation component. This raises a question about the role of the category-specific component beyond general harm representation in LLM safety. To answer this question, we isolate the category-specific component by removing shared general harmfulness representation from each categorical harmfulness representation, yielding a category residual that is orthogonal to general harmfulness at every layer. Using activation steering with category residuals across 11 risk categories in 3 instruction-tuned LLMs, we find that whether category residuals encode harmfulness varies across categories, and that this category-wise pattern is similar across models. Whether category residuals induce refusal also varies across categories, but this category-wise pattern is more model-dependent. We also find that category residuals increase LLMs' downstream internal alignment with shared general harmfulness representation. Together, these findings demonstrate that more fine-grained category residuals should also be considered beyond shared general harmfulness representation to fully understand LLM safety. More broadly, our findings show that even a direction orthogonal to a concept at one layer can contribute to the concept's downstream amplification.
Computation and Language (cs.CL)
arXiv:2609.19366 [cs.CL]
(or arXiv:2609.19366v1 [cs.CL] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.19366 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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