aiqbench analysis
This paper shifts the safety discourse from purely capability-based risks to organizational structural dynamics, arguing that institutions building AI systems are prone to the same "normalization of deviance" seen in historical engineering disasters like the Challenger and Boeing 737 MAX. It suggests that current compliance frameworks may be insufficient because organizations can follow all safety procedures while still drifting toward catastrophic failure. This analysis is critical for researchers and policymakers aiming to build robust governance models that address systemic institutional flaws rather than just technical alignment issues.
The Normalization of Deviance in AI Development
arXiv:2609.05749v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Work on the risks of artificial intelligence has focused predominantly on capability risk: the danger that systems become too powerful, too autonomous, or too misaligned with human values. Far less attention has been paid to the organizational level---to whether the institutions building these systems are themselves predisposed to drift toward failure. This paper argues that they are. Regardless of how capable AI systems become, the organizations building them face the same structural dynamics that preceded past major technological disasters. Drawing on case studies of the Space Shuttle Challenger, the Three Mile Island accident, and the Boeing 737 MAX crashes, this paper identifies the common structural mechanisms preceding each failure and maps them onto contemporary AI development. The findings suggest that existing safety infrastructure may provide less protection than it appears, as organizations can complete safety processes in full compliance and still produce catastrophic outcomes. The pre-disaster period of AI development is still underway; the purpose of this paper is to make these dynamics legible while they can still be interrupted.
Abstract:Work on the risks of artificial intelligence has focused predominantly on capability risk: the danger that systems become too powerful, too autonomous, or too misaligned with human values. Far less attention has been paid to the organizational level---to whether the institutions building these systems are themselves predisposed to drift toward failure. This paper argues that they are. Regardless of how capable AI systems become, the organizations building them face the same structural dynamics that preceded past major technological disasters. Drawing on case studies of the Space Shuttle Challenger, the Three Mile Island accident, and the Boeing 737 MAX crashes, this paper identifies the common structural mechanisms preceding each failure and maps them onto contemporary AI development. The findings suggest that existing safety infrastructure may provide less protection than it appears, as organizations can complete safety processes in full compliance and still produce catastrophic outcomes. The pre-disaster period of AI development is still underway; the purpose of this paper is to make these dynamics legible while they can still be interrupted.
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Emerging Technologies (cs.ET); Systems and Control (eess.SY)
arXiv:2609.05749 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2609.05749v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.05749 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 271 words
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