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This research identifies a critical vulnerability where recommendation systems can be subtly manipulated to surface poisoned content to autonomous LLM agents, bypassing standard similarity thresholds via feedback loops. The study demonstrates how adversaries can craft realistic posts that steer an agent's feed without direct exposure, highlighting a significant security gap in the deployment of AI agents on social platforms.
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The Like Trap: Multi-Stage Poisoning against Agents in Similarity-based Recommendation Systems

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2609.27155v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: With recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) and LLM-based agents, these agents are becoming increasingly autonomous and gaining broader access to act on users' behalf on the internet. However, the vulnerability of automated agents deployed on social media platforms (e.g., for managing a user's personal account) remains underexplored. Existing studies on agent poisoning typically assume that the adversary can expose poisoned content to the agent. Although such an attack is direct and effective, it is more easily detected and mitigated. In the context of social media platforms, this leaves open whether the recommendation system itself would surface such content to the agent in a more subtle manner. Through theoretical analysis, we show that the like-score mechanism used in OASIS can be exploited, and we characterize the conditions under which a multi-stage chain of poisoned posts can steer the agent's feed. Based on these insights, we further develop an algorithm that crafts realistic poisoned posts. Experiments support our theoretical findings and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. Notably, by exploiting the like-score feedback loop, the attack causes the recommendation system to select poisoned posts even when their user-post similarity falls below the retrieval threshold.

Abstract:With recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) and LLM-based agents, these agents are becoming increasingly autonomous and gaining broader access to act on users' behalf on the internet. However, the vulnerability of automated agents deployed on social media platforms (e.g., for managing a user's personal account) remains underexplored. Existing studies on agent poisoning typically assume that the adversary can expose poisoned content to the agent. Although such an attack is direct and effective, it is more easily detected and mitigated. In the context of social media platforms, this leaves open whether the recommendation system itself would surface such content to the agent in a more subtle manner. Through theoretical analysis, we show that the like-score mechanism used in OASIS can be exploited, and we characterize the conditions under which a multi-stage chain of poisoned posts can steer the agent's feed. Based on these insights, we further develop an algorithm that crafts realistic poisoned posts. Experiments support our theoretical findings and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. Notably, by exploiting the like-score feedback loop, the attack causes the recommendation system to select poisoned posts even when their user-post similarity falls below the retrieval threshold.

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG); Machine Learning (stat.ML)

arXiv:2609.27155 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2609.27155v1 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.27155 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 299 words

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