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This research identifies a critical safety vulnerability in self-evolving AI agents where biased LLM judges effectively disable the "skill retirement" mechanism, allowing poor behaviors to persist undetected by aggregate metrics. The study demonstrates that even small false-pass rates can silently halt an agent's ability to prune bad skills, posing a systemic risk for autonomous systems relying on reference-free evaluation without external verification.
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The Blind Curator: How a Biased Judge Silently Disables Skill Retirement in Self-Evolving Agents

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2607.07436v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: A self-evolving agent retires its bad skills by watching them fail, so what happens when the judge cannot see the failures? Skill retirement is the structural constraint that keeps a growing library from drifting below the no-skill baseline, but its guarantee assumes an unbiased reward, which is false for the LLM judges that reference-free tasks require. We show that a biased judge does not merely add noise; it \emph{silently switches off the curator}. We make this precise with a corrupted-reward analysis, then a behavioral study on a reference-free report-writing testbed with a code-generation cross-check, injecting corruption on top of a deterministic reward to isolate the causal channel. Symmetric noise leaves retirement intact, but \emph{false-pass} bias (failures slipping through as passes) disables contribution-based retirement past a sharp threshold (here a false-pass rate of $0.45$) that no amount of data can cross. Separating genuine retirement from cap-eviction churn shows this \emph{mechanism} failure is universal, holding across domains and failure rates and sparing only near-zero-false-pass, verifier-like graders. The downstream \emph{outcome}, though, is regime-dependent: eval quality degrades only where the same corruption also starves skill synthesis, and otherwise holds steady, so the disabled curator is \emph{silent}, surfacing in no aggregate metric. The contribution is a behavioral safety result, not a performance one. A cheap defect-injection audit then tells an operator, before deployment, which side of the threshold their judge occupies.

Abstract:A self-evolving agent retires its bad skills by watching them fail, so what happens when the judge cannot see the failures? Skill retirement is the structural constraint that keeps a growing library from drifting below the no-skill baseline, but its guarantee assumes an unbiased reward, which is false for the LLM judges that reference-free tasks require. We show that a biased judge does not merely add noise; it \emph{silently switches off the curator}. We make this precise with a corrupted-reward analysis, then a behavioral study on a reference-free report-writing testbed with a code-generation cross-check, injecting corruption on top of a deterministic reward to isolate the causal channel. Symmetric noise leaves retirement intact, but \emph{false-pass} bias (failures slipping through as passes) disables contribution-based retirement past a sharp threshold (here a false-pass rate of $0.45$) that no amount of data can cross. Separating genuine retirement from cap-eviction churn shows this \emph{mechanism} failure is universal, holding across domains and failure rates and sparing only near-zero-false-pass, verifier-like graders. The downstream \emph{outcome}, though, is regime-dependent: eval quality degrades only where the same corruption also starves skill synthesis, and otherwise holds steady, so the disabled curator is \emph{silent}, surfacing in no aggregate metric. The contribution is a behavioral safety result, not a performance one. A cheap defect-injection audit then tells an operator, before deployment, which side of the threshold their judge occupies.

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)

arXiv:2607.07436 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2607.07436v2 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.07436 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 326 words

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