aiqbench analysis
This paper introduces TensorCommitments, a lightweight cryptographic scheme designed to verify Large Language Model inference without requiring the client to re-run the model or possess high-end GPU hardware. By binding LLM outputs to irreversible tags via multivariate Terkle Trees, the method ensures that remote services cannot tamper with results while adding negligible overhead to both prover and verifier times.
TensorCommitments: A Lightweight Verifiable Inference for Language Models
arXiv:2602.12630v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Most large language models (LLMs) run on external clouds: users send a prompt, pay for inference, and must trust that the remote GPU executes the LLM without any adversarial tampering. We critically ask how to achieve verifiable LLM inference, where a prover (the service) must convince a verifier (the client) that an inference was run correctly without rerunning the LLM. Existing cryptographic works are too slow at the LLM scale, while non-cryptographic ones require a strong verifier GPU. We propose TensorCommitments (TCs), a tensor-native proof-of-inference scheme. TC binds the LLM inference to a commitment, an irreversible tag that breaks under tampering, organized in our multivariate Terkle Trees. For LLaMA2, TC adds only 0.97% prover and 0.12% verifier time over inference while improving robustness to tailored LLM attacks by up to 48% over the best prior work requiring a verifier GPU.
Abstract:Most large language models (LLMs) run on external clouds: users send a prompt, pay for inference, and must trust that the remote GPU executes the LLM without any adversarial tampering. We critically ask how to achieve verifiable LLM inference, where a prover (the service) must convince a verifier (the client) that an inference was run correctly without rerunning the LLM. Existing cryptographic works are too slow at the LLM scale, while non-cryptographic ones require a strong verifier GPU. We propose TensorCommitments (TCs), a tensor-native proof-of-inference scheme. TC binds the LLM inference to a commitment, an irreversible tag that breaks under tampering, organized in our multivariate Terkle Trees. For LLaMA2, TC adds only 0.97% prover and 0.12% verifier time over inference while improving robustness to tailored LLM attacks by up to 48% over the best prior work requiring a verifier GPU.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2602.12630 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2602.12630v2 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2602.12630 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 236 words
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