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This research exposes a fundamental flaw in standard LLM backtesting, demonstrating that apparent performance gains near training cutoffs often stem from legitimate recency knowledge rather than data leakage. The authors propose rigorous measurement techniques using external references to distinguish genuine model skill from structural artifacts, effectively clearing several frontier models of false advantages previously attributed to contamination.
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Temporal Leakage in LLM Backtesting: Measurement, Validation, and Adjusted Scores

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2608.02985v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The standard check for contamination in LLM backtests is simple: compare scores before and after the training cutoff. We show this check is uninformative. Four flagship models fail it on questions they cannot have memorized: every scored question resolved after their cutoffs. The reason is structural. Models legitimately know more about times near their cutoff, so recency mimics leakage, and we prove no passive backtest can separate the two from genuine skill. Measurement, not just detection, requires information from outside the backtest. We supply it in two forms. A known cutoff identifies leakage at the boundary; a matched clean control identifies it globally and yields a leakage-adjusted score. We also derive where leakage hides: it concentrates on outcomes that surprised the crowd and were well covered in training, and partial memorization is disproportionately rewarded. We validate the estimators against ground truth by planting leakage in twin models, where they recover the injected dose and return null on clean questions. Deployed on frontier models, they detect one cutoff-localized signature and, at the audit's power floor, clear five models whose apparent advantages were recency alone. Backtests need not be discarded; they need one defensible reference.

Abstract:The standard check for contamination in LLM backtests is simple: compare scores before and after the training cutoff. We show this check is uninformative. Four flagship models fail it on questions they cannot have memorized: every scored question resolved after their cutoffs. The reason is structural. Models legitimately know more about times near their cutoff, so recency mimics leakage, and we prove no passive backtest can separate the two from genuine skill. Measurement, not just detection, requires information from outside the backtest. We supply it in two forms. A known cutoff identifies leakage at the boundary; a matched clean control identifies it globally and yields a leakage-adjusted score. We also derive where leakage hides: it concentrates on outcomes that surprised the crowd and were well covered in training, and partial memorization is disproportionately rewarded. We validate the estimators against ground truth by planting leakage in twin models, where they recover the injected dose and return null on clean questions. Deployed on frontier models, they detect one cutoff-localized signature and, at the audit's power floor, clear five models whose apparent advantages were recency alone. Backtests need not be discarded; they need one defensible reference.

Machine Learning (cs.LG); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Machine Learning (stat.ML)

arXiv:2608.02985 [cs.LG]

(or arXiv:2608.02985v1 [cs.LG] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.02985 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 294 words

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