Strategic Type Spaces

Abstract:We provide a strategic foundation for information: in any given game with incomplete information we define strategic quotients as information representations that are sufficient for players to compute best-responses to other players. We prove 1/ existence and essential uniqueness of a minimal strategic quotient called the Strategic Type Space (STS) in which a type is given by an interim correlated rationalizability hierarchy and represents a set of beliefs over other players' types and nature that rationalize this hierarchy and 2/ that the minimal STS has a recursive structure that is captured by a finite automaton.

Theoretical Economics (econ.TH); Computation and Language (cs.CL)

arXiv:2606.08297 [econ.TH]

(or arXiv:2606.08297v2 [econ.TH] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.08297 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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