aiqbench analysis
SRD-GUARD introduces a parameter-free defense framework that mitigates jailbreak attacks by semantically rewriting prompts and employing consensus-based risk scoring across multiple models. This approach effectively exposes concealed harmful intent while maintaining high accuracy in distinguishing legitimate requests from disguised threats, offering a robust solution for safety-critical LLM deployments.
SRD-GUARD: A Defense Framework of LLMs via Semantic Rewriting and Joint Multi-Model Scoring for Latent Intent Exposure
arXiv:2609.06540v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in safety-critical applications, yet jailbreak attacks can conceal harmful intent through role-playing, fictional scenarios, or seemingly benign motivations. Existing inference-time defenses may miss disguised attacks or excessively refuse legitimate requests. We propose SRD-GUARD, a parameter-free, black-box defense framework that exposes concealed intent through semantic rewriting and consensus-based risk assessment. Given an input prompt, SRD-GUARD generates five semantically related rewrites that preserve the underlying objective while removing unnecessary contextual packaging. The original prompt and rewrites are jointly evaluated by multiple independent LLM-based safety scorers on a continuous risk scale. A decision module combines absolute risk thresholds with relative risk changes between the original and rewritten prompts to adaptively intercept, preserve, or warn on requests. We evaluate SRD-GUARD against UNIATTACK, CIPHER, and DeepInception on Llama-3-8B-Uncensored and DeepSeek-V4-Flash using AdvBench and OR-Bench-Hard. SRD-GUARD achieves average DSRs of 91.44% and 100%, with ORRs of 8.00% and 12.00%, respectively. Compared with evaluated baselines, it provides a more favorable DSR--ORR trade-off. Ablation studies show that rewriting exposes concealed harmful intent, joint scoring improves robustness to individual evaluator behavior, and risk-adaptive decision making enables selective handling of ambiguous inputs. These results demonstrate that semantic intent exposure, consensus-based risk assessment, and relative-risk-aware routing provide an effective and selective approach to black-box jailbreak defense. The artifact is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/status/CICD-Guard-D648.
Abstract:Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in safety-critical applications, yet jailbreak attacks can conceal harmful intent through role-playing, fictional scenarios, or seemingly benign motivations. Existing inference-time defenses may miss disguised attacks or excessively refuse legitimate requests. We propose SRD-GUARD, a parameter-free, black-box defense framework that exposes concealed intent through semantic rewriting and consensus-based risk assessment. Given an input prompt, SRD-GUARD generates five semantically related rewrites that preserve the underlying objective while removing unnecessary contextual packaging. The original prompt and rewrites are jointly evaluated by multiple independent LLM-based safety scorers on a continuous risk scale. A decision module combines absolute risk thresholds with relative risk changes between the original and rewritten prompts to adaptively intercept, preserve, or warn on requests. We evaluate SRD-GUARD against UNIATTACK, CIPHER, and DeepInception on Llama-3-8B-Uncensored and DeepSeek-V4-Flash using AdvBench and OR-Bench-Hard. SRD-GUARD achieves average DSRs of 91.44% and 100%, with ORRs of 8.00% and 12.00%, respectively. Compared with evaluated baselines, it provides a more favorable DSR--ORR trade-off. Ablation studies show that rewriting exposes concealed harmful intent, joint scoring improves robustness to individual evaluator behavior, and risk-adaptive decision making enables selective handling of ambiguous inputs. These results demonstrate that semantic intent exposure, consensus-based risk assessment, and relative-risk-aware routing provide an effective and selective approach to black-box jailbreak defense. The artifact is available at this https URL.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2609.06540 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2609.06540v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.06540 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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