aiqbench analysis
This study identifies critical spectral side channels in wavelength-division multiplexers (WDMs) within quantum key distribution systems when subjected to high-power laser injections, such as Trojan-horse attacks. By demonstrating that these optical components can degrade secure transmission distances by nearly 34%, the research highlights a tangible vulnerability in current QKD hardware architectures. The findings underscore the necessity of hardening specific optical layers against physical layer attacks to maintain robust quantum security standards.
Spectral side channels of wavelength-division multiplexer in quantum key distribution under laser damage
arXiv:2512.11701v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: In the transmitter of a quantum key distribution (QKD) system, a wavelength-division multiplexer (WDM) is typically used to combine quantum and synchronization signals and is directly connected to the quantum channel. As a result, it becomes the first optical component exposed to laser-injection attacks. Therefore, understanding the behavior of WDMs under such attacks is essential for assessing the practical security of QKD systems. In this work, we systematically investigate the characteristics of WDMs under high-power laser illumination. Our experimental results show that certain WDM samples exhibit pronounced changes in their spectral features once the injected laser power surpasses a specific threshold. Taking the Trojan-horse attack as an illustrative example, we further perform a theoretical analysis of the resulting spectral side channel and show that it can reduce the maximum secure transmission distance to below $66.9\%$ of its original value. By combining experimental observations with theoretical modeling, this study advances the understanding of the influence of WDMs on the practical security of QKD systems.
Abstract:In the transmitter of a quantum key distribution (QKD) system, a wavelength-division multiplexer (WDM) is typically used to combine quantum and synchronization signals and is directly connected to the quantum channel. As a result, it becomes the first optical component exposed to laser-injection attacks. Therefore, understanding the behavior of WDMs under such attacks is essential for assessing the practical security of QKD systems. In this work, we systematically investigate the characteristics of WDMs under high-power laser illumination. Our experimental results show that certain WDM samples exhibit pronounced changes in their spectral features once the injected laser power surpasses a specific threshold. Taking the Trojan-horse attack as an illustrative example, we further perform a theoretical analysis of the resulting spectral side channel and show that it can reduce the maximum secure transmission distance to below $66.9\%$ of its original value. By combining experimental observations with theoretical modeling, this study advances the understanding of the influence of WDMs on the practical security of QKD systems.
arXiv:2512.11701 [quant-ph]
(or arXiv:2512.11701v2 [quant-ph] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2512.11701 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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