Social Media Bans Aren’t Enough to Make Children Safe

Even before France approved legislation banning social media for children under 15 last January, 13-year-old Benjamin was already wondering what life without social media would look like. “If we want to play football, we won’t be able to organize it. What will we do? Send letters instead?” he joked in an interview for Le Monde. His reaction captured the central challenge behind the growing wave of youth social media bans: Removing access is one thing; understanding what those platforms mean in children’s lives is another. Within weeks of Australia’s similar ban, the country’s eSafety Commissioner reported that platforms had restricted access to 4.7 million under-16 accounts. Two months later, though, one in five Australian teenagers under 16 was still using TikTok and Snapchat, according to a parental-control data company. But even if all children’s social media accounts were to disappear, do such bans actually make children safer online? Governments are moving ahead without answering that question as they follow Australia’s lead. Indonesia’s child-safety framework, which took effect in March, bars children under 16 from holding accounts on “high-risk” platforms. The U.K. government has announced plans to ban social media for under-16s, add default overnight social media curfews for 16- and 17-year-olds, and extend child-safety rules to cover risky AI features. And on 17 September, the European Commission proposed the EU KIDS Act, which would bar children under 13 from social media, set 15 as the EU-wide minimum age for opening an account independently, and require platforms to show that their services are age appropriate and safe by design. But based on my experience working on Child Online Protection initiatives with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) across Southeast Asia and the Pacific, I know the bans don’t address the real problems. Instead, we should be paying more attention to the systems that generate harm in the first place—namely, recommender algorithms, engagement-maximizing design, opaque moderation, and extractive data practices. Account removals are not the same as online child safety My experience working on protecting children’s online safety has taught me three main lessons: First, the public institutions responsible for child online protection often lack the staff, budget, or technical capacity to enforce complex online safety policies. Indonesia is illustrative. A 2026 UNICEF evaluation found capacity constraints among service providers, long-term funding uncertainty, and a need for specialized personnel. At the local level, some staff lacked digital skills, while budget constraints left some areas reliant on external support. Second, many children, and often their parents, lack the digital literacy and critical thinking skills needed to navigate online risks safely. My policy research on child online protection in Indonesia, published earlier this year in Digital Society, found substantial gaps that account removals cannot repair: Many children lacked guidance on navigating the internet safely, and large numbers did not know how to report harmful experiences. And third, the platforms have limited independent oversight as they identify underage users, design age-verification systems, and report their own compliance. In Indonesia, platforms themselves are responsible for carrying out age verification, while the Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs oversees compliance. TikTok’s appeals process for users flagged as underage, for instance, can require a government-issued ID and selfies, which is a problem because it involves collecting the additional personal data on an ID card, beyond that needed to confirm age. Will government regulators ensure that TikTok handles that data responsibly? The privacy paradox of proving age Every age-based ban creates an engineering problem: How can a platform reliably determine that a user is old enough, without intruding on other information? Governments and companies may use identity documents, parental authorization, app-store checks, or facial age estimation. Each approach has trade-offs among accuracy, privacy, accessibility, and resistance to circumvention. There are also technical issues. One tool, facial age estimation, draws on enormous databases but it is probabilistic, not exact, because people vary so much. It’s also been shown to misclassify both children and adults. The challenge should not merely be to “verify age.” It should be to prove that someone is above a threshold, without disclosing their identity, birth date, or other information third parties might use to create a marketing profile. The European Commission’s age-verification blueprint challenges companies to verify ages without collecting all that additional information. Privacy-preserving technologies offer promising ways to achieve this. Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) can confirm that someone meets an age threshold without revealing their identity or

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