aiqbench analysis
This study investigates how social influence mechanisms alter the behavior of AI agents when they act as readers in academic markets, revealing that exposure to peer selections significantly narrows the breadth of scientific attention covered. The findings demonstrate that even simple information rules can cause AI populations to concentrate on fewer papers and ignore metrics like citation counts or download statistics that typically guide human researchers. These results are critical for understanding future dynamics in automated literature review systems and the potential for algorithmic echo chambers within scientific communities.
Social Influence and the Allocation of Scientific Attention in AI Populations
arXiv:2609.22408v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI systems are becoming participants in the evaluation and use of scientific research. They encounter citation counts, download statistics and lists of popular articles developed around human readers, but the collective consequences of these signals for artificial readers remain uncertain. This paper adapts the Music Lab design to a market for academic attention. In the first experiment, 1,000 AI agents choose papers from the titles and abstracts of all 114 regular research articles published in the American Economic Review in 2025. The experiment has five independent-choice communities and five social-influence communities, each with 100 sequential agents. Only agents in the social-influence condition observe earlier selections within their community. Agents may select any number of papers. Social-information communities select 17.2 percent fewer papers per agent, concentrate their choices more heavily, and collectively cover 73 papers, compared with 90 independently. Between-community variation is greater under social information. In a second experiment with 200 agents across twenty social communities, randomly assigning papers five initial selections raises their subsequent selection rate by 45.55 percentage points (95% CI: 41.20 to 49.90). Choices have modest correspondence with external citations and little correspondence with download counts. The results show how a simple information rule shapes the volume, breadth and distribution of scientific attention in an artificial population.
Abstract:AI systems are becoming participants in the evaluation and use of scientific research. They encounter citation counts, download statistics and lists of popular articles developed around human readers, but the collective consequences of these signals for artificial readers remain uncertain. This paper adapts the Music Lab design to a market for academic attention. In the first experiment, 1,000 AI agents choose papers from the titles and abstracts of all 114 regular research articles published in the American Economic Review in 2025. The experiment has five independent-choice communities and five social-influence communities, each with 100 sequential agents. Only agents in the social-influence condition observe earlier selections within their community. Agents may select any number of papers. Social-information communities select 17.2 percent fewer papers per agent, concentrate their choices more heavily, and collectively cover 73 papers, compared with 90 independently. Between-community variation is greater under social information. In a second experiment with 200 agents across twenty social communities, randomly assigning papers five initial selections raises their subsequent selection rate by 45.55 percentage points (95% CI: 41.20 to 49.90). Choices have modest correspondence with external citations and little correspondence with download counts. The results show how a simple information rule shapes the volume, breadth and distribution of scientific attention in an artificial population.
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); General Economics (econ.GN)
arXiv:2609.22408 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2609.22408v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.22408 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 307 words
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