aiqbench analysis
The paper introduces SkillHarm, a benchmark for poisoned third-party "skills" that LLM agents load and execute, including attacks that mutate persistent skill content and fire only on later reuse. Reported attack success rates reach 86.3% (fixed payload) and 69.3% (self-mutating), and the authors note that many apparent failures reflect agents never reading the poisoned file rather than resisting it. For practitioners, the takeaway is that skill and plugin supply chains are a serious agent-security surface, and that benchmark results on defenses should be read with the "non-engagement" confound in mind.
SkillHarm: Lifecycle-Aware Skill-Based Attacks via Automated Construction
arXiv:2606.02540v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Agent skills occupy a privileged position in the agent workflow, as agents are expected to implicitly follow and execute them, rendering third-party skills a vulnerable attack surface. Existing studies have revealed unsafe agent behaviors induced by skill-based attacks, but they primarily evaluate poisoned skills within a single task execution and enumerate harms through ad hoc risk lists. To bridge these gaps, we introduce SkillHarm, a benchmark of skill-based attacks across the skill-use lifecycle, paired with a systematic taxonomy of skill-relevant risks. SkillHarm evaluates two attack scenarios: Fixed-Payload Poisoning (FPP), where a fixed poisoned skill package directly compromises any task session that invokes it, and Self-Mutating Poisoning (SMP), where an initially benign execution silently mutates persistent skill content, deferring harm until a subsequent reuse. It further defines 12 risk types based on the agent workflow component targeted by the harm: data pipelines, system environments, and agent autonomy. To instantiate these attacks at scale, we build AutoSkillHarm, an automated construction pipeline with coding agents driven by natural-language harnesses. The resulting benchmark contains 879 attack samples across 71 skills. Experiments show that current agents remain vulnerable with attack success rates up to 86.3% in FPP and 69.3% in SMP. Our analysis further reveals a latent risk: many apparent attack failures stem from the agent failing to engage with the poisoned file rather than genuine resistance, and current defenses still fail to reliably mitigate the threat.
Abstract:Agent skills occupy a privileged position in the agent workflow, as agents are expected to implicitly follow and execute them, rendering third-party skills a vulnerable attack surface. Existing studies have revealed unsafe agent behaviors induced by skill-based attacks, but they primarily evaluate poisoned skills within a single task execution and enumerate harms through ad hoc risk lists. To bridge these gaps, we introduce SkillHarm, a benchmark of skill-based attacks across the skill-use lifecycle, paired with a systematic taxonomy of skill-relevant risks. SkillHarm evaluates two attack scenarios: Fixed-Payload Poisoning (FPP), where a fixed poisoned skill package directly compromises any task session that invokes it, and Self-Mutating Poisoning (SMP), where an initially benign execution silently mutates persistent skill content, deferring harm until a subsequent reuse. It further defines 12 risk types based on the agent workflow component targeted by the harm: data pipelines, system environments, and agent autonomy. To instantiate these attacks at scale, we build AutoSkillHarm, an automated construction pipeline with coding agents driven by natural-language harnesses. The resulting benchmark contains 879 attack samples across 71 skills. Experiments show that current agents remain vulnerable with attack success rates up to 86.3% in FPP and 69.3% in SMP. Our analysis further reveals a latent risk: many apparent attack failures stem from the agent failing to engage with the poisoned file rather than genuine resistance, and current defenses still fail to reliably mitigate the threat.
EMNLP 2026 Main. Project Homepage: this https URL
Computation and Language (cs.CL)
arXiv:2606.02540 [cs.CL]
(or arXiv:2606.02540v2 [cs.CL] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.02540 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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