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SingProbe introduces an efficient intrinsic runtime guardrail that leverages hidden states from LLM inference to monitor safety and hallucination risks with negligible overhead. By reusing internal representations rather than relying on external models, this approach significantly reduces inference costs while maintaining robust detection capabilities for emerging unsafe content. The methodology also extends to specialized domains like medical generation, offering a scalable solution for reliable large language model deployment.
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SingProbe Technical Report

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2608.30703v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Runtime guardrails are essential for reliable large language model (LLM) deployment, yet existing approaches typically rely on independent, external models that introduce additional inference cost, delayed safety signals, and a capacity mismatch with increasingly capable base models. To address these issues, we introduce SingProbe, a lightweight intrinsic runtime guard that directly reuses hidden states produced during LLM inference and operates alongside autoregressive decoding. Within a unified framework, SingProbe continuously predicts query intent, response safety, and hallucination risk at the token level with negligible additional guardrail inference overhead, offering a "free-lunch" solution. We further introduce SingStreamBench, a benchmark designed to assess whether streaming guardrails remain inactive on benign prefixes while promptly detecting emerging unsafe content. Extensive experiments show that SingProbe achieves competitive or superior performance compared with substantially larger standalone guardrails and specialized hallucination detectors, with only $\approx$2M parameters and $<0.5\%$ extra overhead. Beyond passive detection, we also show that SingProbe scores can anticipate future generation risk and guide constrained safe decoding. We further extend this paradigm to medical generation through SingProbe-Med, which selectively activates risk-directed decoding interventions only when clinically relevant risks emerge. Together, these results demonstrate that internal model representations provide an effective and efficient interface for generation-time monitoring and control.

Abstract:Runtime guardrails are essential for reliable large language model (LLM) deployment, yet existing approaches typically rely on independent, external models that introduce additional inference cost, delayed safety signals, and a capacity mismatch with increasingly capable base models. To address these issues, we introduce SingProbe, a lightweight intrinsic runtime guard that directly reuses hidden states produced during LLM inference and operates alongside autoregressive decoding. Within a unified framework, SingProbe continuously predicts query intent, response safety, and hallucination risk at the token level with negligible additional guardrail inference overhead, offering a "free-lunch" solution. We further introduce SingStreamBench, a benchmark designed to assess whether streaming guardrails remain inactive on benign prefixes while promptly detecting emerging unsafe content. Extensive experiments show that SingProbe achieves competitive or superior performance compared with substantially larger standalone guardrails and specialized hallucination detectors, with only $\approx$2M parameters and $<0.5\%$ extra overhead. Beyond passive detection, we also show that SingProbe scores can anticipate future generation risk and guide constrained safe decoding. We further extend this paradigm to medical generation through SingProbe-Med, which selectively activates risk-directed decoding interventions only when clinically relevant risks emerge. Together, these results demonstrate that internal model representations provide an effective and efficient interface for generation-time monitoring and control.

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Machine Learning (cs.LG)

arXiv:2608.30703 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2608.30703v1 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.30703 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 307 words

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