aiqbench analysis
This research identifies a critical security vulnerability in LLM-driven robotics where backdoors are triggered by the agent's own internal history rather than external stimuli, making them nearly undetectable during normal operation. The study demonstrates that manipulating initial instructions can embed these stealthy triggers, leading to severe safety failures like collisions or system halts without compromising the robot's utility until activation. These findings highlight an urgent need for new security frameworks that account for the internal state dynamics of autonomous agents integrating large language models.
Silent Sabotage: Internal State Triggered Backdoor Attacks on LLM-Powered Robotic Systems
arXiv:2609.26184v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into robotic control systems is enabling a new generation of autonomous agents capable of complex reasoning and planning. While this paradigm shift accelerates progress, it also introduces novel security risks that remain largely unexplored. Current research into LLM backdoors has focused on attacks triggered by external stimuli, such as specific words, visual objects, or environmental states. These attacks, while potent, overlook a more insidious class of vulnerability where the trigger is internal to the agent's own operational logic. This paper presents the first comprehensive study of history-based backdoor attacks on LLM-powered robotic systems. We demonstrate that an attacker can embed a stealthy backdoor into an LLM-based robot controller by manipulating its instructions. This backdoor is triggered not by an external cue, but by a specific, rare sequence of the robot's own past actions. It remains dormant during normal operation, preserving the robot's utility, but can be activated to induce a malicious behavior, such as a complete stop or a collision. Our experiments, conducted in a simulated environment with a variety of robots and LLMs, show that this history-based attack is highly effective, achieving a near-perfect attack success rate while remaining exceptionally difficult to detect. These findings reveal a critical and previously unaddressed vulnerability in autonomous systems and underscore the urgent need for security measures that account for an agent's internal state.
Abstract:The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into robotic control systems is enabling a new generation of autonomous agents capable of complex reasoning and planning. While this paradigm shift accelerates progress, it also introduces novel security risks that remain largely unexplored. Current research into LLM backdoors has focused on attacks triggered by external stimuli, such as specific words, visual objects, or environmental states. These attacks, while potent, overlook a more insidious class of vulnerability where the trigger is internal to the agent's own operational logic. This paper presents the first comprehensive study of history-based backdoor attacks on LLM-powered robotic systems. We demonstrate that an attacker can embed a stealthy backdoor into an LLM-based robot controller by manipulating its instructions. This backdoor is triggered not by an external cue, but by a specific, rare sequence of the robot's own past actions. It remains dormant during normal operation, preserving the robot's utility, but can be activated to induce a malicious behavior, such as a complete stop or a collision. Our experiments, conducted in a simulated environment with a variety of robots and LLMs, show that this history-based attack is highly effective, achieving a near-perfect attack success rate while remaining exceptionally difficult to detect. These findings reveal a critical and previously unaddressed vulnerability in autonomous systems and underscore the urgent need for security measures that account for an agent's internal state.
Robotics (cs.RO); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
arXiv:2609.26184 [cs.RO]
(or arXiv:2609.26184v1 [cs.RO] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.26184 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-33701-6_7 Focus to learn more DOI(s) linking to related resources
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