aiqbench analysis
This research demonstrates how passive motion data from smartphone accelerometers can serve as a robust auxiliary signal to detect deepfakes and video injection attacks in mobile identity verification systems. By benchmarking various classifiers on the new CanSelfie dataset, the study highlights that raw acceleration is the most informative modality for distinguishing between stationary proxies and genuine users without requiring additional hardware friction. The findings underscore the critical need for multi-modal evidence beyond camera streams to meet emerging regulatory standards against sophisticated presentation attacks.
Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification
arXiv:2605.00218v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Mobile remote identity verification (RIdV) systems are exposed to attacks that manipulate or replace the facial video stream, including presentation attacks, real-time deepfakes, and video injection. Recent European requirements, including ETSI TS 119 461 and CEN/TS 18099, motivate evidence channels beyond camera-based presentation-attack detection. This paper studies whether passive motion traces recorded during selfie capture provide auxiliary evidence for spoof screening and user verification. We introduce CanSelfie, a dataset of 375 bona fide multi-sensor sequences collected at 50 Hz from 30 participants using a commercial mobile RIdV application, together with stationary, handheld, and temporally shifted attack-proxy scenarios. We benchmark 7 multivariate time-series classifiers and 8 whole-series anomaly detectors across sensor configurations and temporal windows. For spoof screening, accelerometer-only ROCKAD obtains 0.00% FRR and 43.8% FAR, while QUANT+3-NN obtains the lowest FAR of 32.0% at 2.37% FRR; both reject all stationary proxies. For same-device and same-session user verification, WEASEL+MUSE reaches 1.07% EER using 9 channels. Raw acceleration is the most informative modality, and closed-set accuracy alone does not imply good verification because threshold calibration depends on score distributions. The findings support selfie-capture motion as a low-friction auxiliary signal, while leaving cross-device, cross-session, and real injection-attack evaluation as necessary next steps. Code and data available at: https://github.com/Ergzar/Selfie-Motion-AD-TSC.
Abstract:Mobile remote identity verification (RIdV) systems are exposed to attacks that manipulate or replace the facial video stream, including presentation attacks, real-time deepfakes, and video injection. Recent European requirements, including ETSI TS 119 461 and CEN/TS 18099, motivate evidence channels beyond camera-based presentation-attack detection. This paper studies whether passive motion traces recorded during selfie capture provide auxiliary evidence for spoof screening and user verification. We introduce CanSelfie, a dataset of 375 bona fide multi-sensor sequences collected at 50 Hz from 30 participants using a commercial mobile RIdV application, together with stationary, handheld, and temporally shifted attack-proxy scenarios. We benchmark 7 multivariate time-series classifiers and 8 whole-series anomaly detectors across sensor configurations and temporal windows. For spoof screening, accelerometer-only ROCKAD obtains 0.00% FRR and 43.8% FAR, while QUANT+3-NN obtains the lowest FAR of 32.0% at 2.37% FRR; both reject all stationary proxies. For same-device and same-session user verification, WEASEL+MUSE reaches 1.07% EER using 9 channels. Raw acceleration is the most informative modality, and closed-set accuracy alone does not imply good verification because threshold calibration depends on score distributions. The findings support selfie-capture motion as a low-friction auxiliary signal, while leaving cross-device, cross-session, and real injection-attack evaluation as necessary next steps. Code and data available at: this https URL.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Emerging Technologies (cs.ET); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2605.00218 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.00218v2 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.00218 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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