aiqbench analysis
This study demonstrates that language models can be subtly manipulated into asking biased preference questions, effectively steering recommendations toward sponsors without altering the final ranking algorithm. The findings highlight a critical vulnerability in AI-driven shopping agents where adversarial instructions degrade synthetic utility and create one-sided elicitation, even if the model's terminal answers appear consistent. These results underscore the need for robust evaluation frameworks that detect such covert influence channels before they impact real-world consumer interactions.
Selective Elicitation as a Commercial Influence Channel: A Reproducible Synthetic Shopping-Agent Stress Test
arXiv:2609.36614v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A commercial incentive need not enter the final ranking algorithm to affect a shopping assistant's recommendation: it may instead influence which preference question the assistant asks. We make this distinction experimentally observable in a deliberately small, synthetic setting. Each task has two products, three verified numerical attributes, a price limit, and a private fixed preference vector. An honest simulated user answers one pairwise question. A separate recommender receives the products and this answer but not the sponsorship assignment. We contrast a neutral question, a soft commercial instruction, and an explicitly adversarial instruction to ask about the sponsor's advantage while omitting the rival's advantage. Across 40 held-out sponsorship-assignment cases (20 distinct catalog-preference contexts), the soft instruction changes no selections. The targeted instruction raises sponsored selection by 0.30 and reduces mean synthetic utility by 0.0547 relative to neutral questioning (95% context-bootstrap interval [-0.0828, -0.0291]) for one language-model recommender. A fixed Bayesian recommender shows a similar effect; a second model makes the same choices on all 120 frozen question-answer inputs. A terminal-answer consistency judge rates all 20 sampled targeted answers consistent, although five have synthetic regret above 0.05; a separate question-coverage dimension flags their one-sided elicitation. A robust partial-preference certificate remains valid under the stipulated synthetic utility but certifies only 16 of 40 targeted cases and is not better than asking a neutral question directly. These results establish neither typical behavior under advertising incentives nor effects on actual consumers.
Abstract:A commercial incentive need not enter the final ranking algorithm to affect a shopping assistant's recommendation: it may instead influence which preference question the assistant asks. We make this distinction experimentally observable in a deliberately small, synthetic setting. Each task has two products, three verified numerical attributes, a price limit, and a private fixed preference vector. An honest simulated user answers one pairwise question. A separate recommender receives the products and this answer but not the sponsorship assignment. We contrast a neutral question, a soft commercial instruction, and an explicitly adversarial instruction to ask about the sponsor's advantage while omitting the rival's advantage. Across 40 held-out sponsorship-assignment cases (20 distinct catalog-preference contexts), the soft instruction changes no selections. The targeted instruction raises sponsored selection by 0.30 and reduces mean synthetic utility by 0.0547 relative to neutral questioning (95% context-bootstrap interval [-0.0828, -0.0291]) for one language-model recommender. A fixed Bayesian recommender shows a similar effect; a second model makes the same choices on all 120 frozen question-answer inputs. A terminal-answer consistency judge rates all 20 sampled targeted answers consistent, although five have synthetic regret above 0.05; a separate question-coverage dimension flags their one-sided elicitation. A robust partial-preference certificate remains valid under the stipulated synthetic utility but certifies only 16 of 40 targeted cases and is not better than asking a neutral question directly. These results establish neither typical behavior under advertising incentives nor effects on actual consumers.
Machine Learning (cs.LG); Computers and Society (cs.CY)
arXiv:2609.36614 [cs.LG]
(or arXiv:2609.36614v1 [cs.LG] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.36614 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
evaluate_defense.py
holdout/certificate-050.json
holdout/config.json
holdout/selector-gemini/config.json
holdout/selector-gemini/summary.json
holdout/selector-gemini/traces.jsonl
holdout/summary.json
holdout/traces.jsonl
pilot/config.json
pilot/summary.json
pilot/traces.jsonl
replay_selector.py
test_experiment.py
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