aiqbench analysis
This research optimizes the efficiency of auditing large language models by identifying that inspecting just 5% of token positions, guided by chat structure rather than full computational signals, is sufficient to detect threats like prompt injection. The study demonstrates significant cost savings for safety auditors while maintaining high success rates in explaining model behaviors regarding concealment and injection attacks. These findings provide a practical framework for scaling explainability efforts without the prohibitive overhead of analyzing every internal activation.
Selecting The Most Informative Tokens in Natural Language Autoencoders
arXiv:2609.37040v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Natural language autoencoders translate a language model's internal activations into readable explanations. Explaining every token position is costly. Which positions should an auditor inspect to understand a potential threat? We study this question across $4.7$ million explanations on prompt injection and concealment. We compare signals from model computation with a ranker trained only on chat structure. Chat structure usually selects more relevant explanations than the computational signals, without requiring a model forward pass for position selection. On three of four datasets, explaining just $5\%$ of positions retains nearly all of the success rate from explaining every position, where success means obtaining an explanation about the threat. The benefit varies with the audit task. We also show that pretrained verbalizers recover words that models have learned to conceal through fine-tuning, without additional verbalizer training. These results identify where auditors can concentrate explanation generation and show that useful explanations can extend beyond the model a verbalizer was trained to describe.
Abstract:Natural language autoencoders translate a language model's internal activations into readable explanations. Explaining every token position is costly. Which positions should an auditor inspect to understand a potential threat? We study this question across $4.7$ million explanations on prompt injection and concealment. We compare signals from model computation with a ranker trained only on chat structure. Chat structure usually selects more relevant explanations than the computational signals, without requiring a model forward pass for position selection. On three of four datasets, explaining just $5\%$ of positions retains nearly all of the success rate from explaining every position, where success means obtaining an explanation about the threat. The benefit varies with the audit task. We also show that pretrained verbalizers recover words that models have learned to conceal through fine-tuning, without additional verbalizer training. These results identify where auditors can concentrate explanation generation and show that useful explanations can extend beyond the model a verbalizer was trained to describe.
Computation and Language (cs.CL); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2609.37040 [cs.CL]
(or arXiv:2609.37040v1 [cs.CL] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.37040 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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