aiqbench analysis
This research exposes a critical security flaw in ROS 2 where modifying a single environment variable allows attackers to hijack robotic arms and spoof sensor telemetry, effectively bypassing remote attestation mechanisms. The study demonstrates that even AI-based detectors can be deceived with fabricated data injected at just 3 ms of jitter, highlighting the fragility of current trust boundaries between physical actions and digital verification in multi-robot systems. These findings are essential for engineers developing safe collaborative robotics, as they reveal how easily compromised third-party packages can undermine the integrity of automated task handovers.
Seeing is Not Believing: Breaking the Physical-to-Digital Trust Boundary in Robotics
arXiv:2609.08280v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In multi-robot collaboration, task handovers rely on downstream verifiers performing remote attestation, which inspects sensor telemetry to ensure a robot's physical behavior strictly matches its assigned task. But can this telemetry be trusted? We show that it often cannot. In this paper, we uncover a severe vulnerability in Robot Operating System (ROS) 2: by modifying a single environment variable, an adversary can execute a pre-built hook to covertly intercept and inject both telemetry and control signals before they are published. Consequently, adversaries can hijack a robot to perform dangerous tasks while spoofing downstream verifiers with synthesized fake telemetry. Worse still, by exploiting the widespread reliance on third-party Docker containers and auxiliary tools, attackers can distribute compromised packages embedded with these malicious hooks to launch such attacks easily. On a physical Franka Emika robotic arm running Secure ROS 2, our attack injects fabricated telemetry in real time with only around 3 ms of jitter, preserving temporal synchronization and hardware integrity while achieving an 87% success rate even against an AI-based detector. We have responsibly disclosed these findings to the ROS 2 development team. We prepared a demo video available at https://youtu.be/ExeiGqUrnhQ.
Abstract:In multi-robot collaboration, task handovers rely on downstream verifiers performing remote attestation, which inspects sensor telemetry to ensure a robot's physical behavior strictly matches its assigned task. But can this telemetry be trusted? We show that it often cannot. In this paper, we uncover a severe vulnerability in Robot Operating System (ROS) 2: by modifying a single environment variable, an adversary can execute a pre-built hook to covertly intercept and inject both telemetry and control signals before they are published. Consequently, adversaries can hijack a robot to perform dangerous tasks while spoofing downstream verifiers with synthesized fake telemetry. Worse still, by exploiting the widespread reliance on third-party Docker containers and auxiliary tools, attackers can distribute compromised packages embedded with these malicious hooks to launch such attacks easily. On a physical Franka Emika robotic arm running Secure ROS 2, our attack injects fabricated telemetry in real time with only around 3 ms of jitter, preserving temporal synchronization and hardware integrity while achieving an 87% success rate even against an AI-based detector. We have responsibly disclosed these findings to the ROS 2 development team. We prepared a demo video available at this https URL.
Robotics (cs.RO); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
arXiv:2609.08280 [cs.RO]
(or arXiv:2609.08280v1 [cs.RO] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.08280 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 289 words
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