aiqbench analysis
SafeAdapt-Poker introduces a novel framework for robust adaptation in dynamic environments by treating opponent behavioral shifts as budgeted deviations from a frozen anchor policy. This approach utilizes dual-counterfactual sequential control to balance immediate exploitation against long-term safety, ensuring continuous performance degradation bounds even under estimation errors. The method demonstrates significant gains in exact-game scenarios and large-scale abstract poker, offering a rigorous solution for maintaining strategic efficacy when facing evolving opponents.
SafeAdapt-Poker: Counterfactual Risk Calibration for Budgeted Adaptation under Opponent Shift
arXiv:2610.20473v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Opponent histories can mislead after behavioral shifts. SafeAdapt-Poker formulates budgeted adaptation under opponent shift as a dual-counterfactual sequential-control problem using only information available before each decision. At each decision the controller asks two distinct questions: what local downside a deviation from the frozen anchor would induce under matched legal continuations, and what future adaptation value would be lost by consuming part of the remaining deviation budget now. The first question is answered by a monotone strategic-risk model over deviation intensity; the second by a paired budget-state continuation model that prices current budget consumption. The controller selects among support-preserving candidate deviations by trading immediate adaptation value against these two quantities, a pathwise cumulative-KL ledger bounds total anchor-relative deviation, and a finite family of frozen controllers is screened on complete paired calibration sessions before held-out interaction. A finite-candidate perturbation bound shows that the allocation objective degrades continuously with continuation-value estimation error. Evaluation covers exact-game exploitation and safety, four opponent shifts, local-risk calibration, delayed-opportunity allocation, direct opportunity-value estimation, value-error robustness, factorial mechanism attribution, budget sensitivity, abstract-HUNL cross-play, and player/time-held-out public-history behavior. On exact Leduc the full controller attains a matched weak-pool gain of +0.0718 with a worst-opponent delta of -0.0126, raises delayed-opportunity capture from 0.6318 under myopic allocation to 0.7841 under the same session budget, and reaches +42.7 mbb/hand in abstract-HUNL cross-play; the retained public-history screen reports 0.5820 action accuracy and 0.9277 log loss versus 0.5039 and 0.9778 for a public prior.
Abstract:Opponent histories can mislead after behavioral shifts. SafeAdapt-Poker formulates budgeted adaptation under opponent shift as a dual-counterfactual sequential-control problem using only information available before each decision. At each decision the controller asks two distinct questions: what local downside a deviation from the frozen anchor would induce under matched legal continuations, and what future adaptation value would be lost by consuming part of the remaining deviation budget now. The first question is answered by a monotone strategic-risk model over deviation intensity; the second by a paired budget-state continuation model that prices current budget consumption. The controller selects among support-preserving candidate deviations by trading immediate adaptation value against these two quantities, a pathwise cumulative-KL ledger bounds total anchor-relative deviation, and a finite family of frozen controllers is screened on complete paired calibration sessions before held-out interaction. A finite-candidate perturbation bound shows that the allocation objective degrades continuously with continuation-value estimation error. Evaluation covers exact-game exploitation and safety, four opponent shifts, local-risk calibration, delayed-opportunity allocation, direct opportunity-value estimation, value-error robustness, factorial mechanism attribution, budget sensitivity, abstract-HUNL cross-play, and player/time-held-out public-history behavior. On exact Leduc the full controller attains a matched weak-pool gain of +0.0718 with a worst-opponent delta of -0.0126, raises delayed-opportunity capture from 0.6318 under myopic allocation to 0.7841 under the same session budget, and reaches +42.7 mbb/hand in abstract-HUNL cross-play; the retained public-history screen reports 0.5820 action accuracy and 0.9277 log loss versus 0.5039 and 0.9778 for a public prior.
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2610.20473 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2610.20473v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.20473 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 342 words
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