aiqbench analysis
This research introduces Cros, a risk-constrained stopping layer designed to improve the reliability of autonomous clinical diagnosis agents by rigorously defining when an AI should halt its diagnostic sequence. By combining state-wise error ranking with frozen testing rules, the method achieves significantly lower selective error rates and test costs compared to native stopping or maximum probability baselines in sequential medical workflows. While the study provides valuable audit evidence for safety-critical applications, it explicitly notes that findings from evaluated splits where labels were inspected do not constitute a final safety certificate.
Safe to Stop? Risk-Constrained Stopping for Sequential Clinical Diagnosis Agents
arXiv:2609.09678v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Clinical diagnosis agents must decide not only what test to request next, but also when to diagnose or defer. Existing agent benchmarks largely evaluate accuracy after fixed or unconstrained interaction, leaving autonomous stopping reliability implicit. We present Cros, a risk-constrained stopping layer combining state-wise error ranking, policy design on disjoint development splits, and LTT-style exact tests of selective diagnostic error and minimum autonomous coverage for complete sequential policies. Its finite-sample guarantee requires the candidate family, testing rule, and any randomization to be frozen before calibration labels are accessed. On a 1,834-episode MIMIC-derived abdominal-pain benchmark, the full ranker achieves exploratory state-error AUROC 0.853, compared with 0.715 for maximum class probability and 0.552 for the backbone's native stop score. On the previously viewed 367-episode evaluation split, analytically averaging over the frozen Cros weights yields 16.9% selective error at 78.8% coverage, cost 5.57, and 0.68 tests, versus 30.8% error at 100% coverage, cost 8.14, and 1.53 tests under native stopping. Forced continuation is non-monotone: error is 28.3% with HPI alone and 34.3% after full workup. However, the uniform-weight mixture ablation is cheaper on this viewed split despite missing the locked development margins, and Cros nominally satisfies the joint criterion in only 6 of 20 development resplits. Because evaluation labels were inspected during earlier development, these findings provide exploratory feasibility and audit evidence, not a confirmatory safety certificate.
Title:Safe to Stop? Risk-Constrained Stopping for Sequential Clinical Diagnosis Agents
Abstract:Clinical diagnosis agents must decide not only what test to request next, but also when to diagnose or defer. Existing agent benchmarks largely evaluate accuracy after fixed or unconstrained interaction, leaving autonomous stopping reliability implicit. We present Cros, a risk-constrained stopping layer combining state-wise error ranking, policy design on disjoint development splits, and LTT-style exact tests of selective diagnostic error and minimum autonomous coverage for complete sequential policies. Its finite-sample guarantee requires the candidate family, testing rule, and any randomization to be frozen before calibration labels are accessed. On a 1,834-episode MIMIC-derived abdominal-pain benchmark, the full ranker achieves exploratory state-error AUROC 0.853, compared with 0.715 for maximum class probability and 0.552 for the backbone's native stop score. On the previously viewed 367-episode evaluation split, analytically averaging over the frozen Cros weights yields 16.9% selective error at 78.8% coverage, cost 5.57, and 0.68 tests, versus 30.8% error at 100% coverage, cost 8.14, and 1.53 tests under native stopping. Forced continuation is non-monotone: error is 28.3% with HPI alone and 34.3% after full workup. However, the uniform-weight mixture ablation is cheaper on this viewed split despite missing the locked development margins, and Cros nominally satisfies the joint criterion in only 6 of 20 development resplits. Because evaluation labels were inspected during earlier development, these findings provide exploratory feasibility and audit evidence, not a confirmatory safety certificate.
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2609.09678 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2609.09678v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.09678 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 328 words
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